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PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL VALUES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION THROUGH THE RULE OF LAW
Articles 2 and 7 TEU from a legal, historical and comparative angle1
FOREWORD
The present study is the result of my research during a 
fellowship at the European University Institute (EUI) 
in the academic year 2015/2016 (N.B.: the manuscript 
was closed on 1 June 2016. More recent developments 
are only briefly referred to in the footnotes). The idea 
for the topic was born quite some time before and, as 
it often happens, the article grew bigger with time. It 
reflects more than three decades of studies in European 
Law, first as a student, then as a researcher and teacher, 
followed by more than twenty years of practice in 
applying Union law at the European Commission’s 
Legal Service. 
The text in front of you combines the shortcomings of 
an analysis which is both, too long and too short. Too 
long for an overview and too short for an exhaustive 
discussion of all the issues raised by Fundamental Values 
and the Rule of Law in a multi-layer system such as the 
European Union. On a more positive note, it combines 
practical experience with the implementation of Union 
law ‘on the ground’ with an academic approach. It 
intends to shed some light on the interpretation of the 
fundamental values mentioned in Article 2 TEU and 
the mechanisms for their enforcement, in particular 
Article 7 TEU. For this purpose I  put them in a 
historical and comparative context. From a practical 
perspective, it shows the dilemma the Commission 
is facing before initiating a formal procedure under 
Article 7 TEU.  It is the Council/the European Council 
taking the final decision regarding the existence of a 
clear risk of a serious breach/existence of a serious 
and persistent breach. The majority thresholds for 
both decisions are very high (4/5 or even unanimity). 
When faced with the question whether to commence 
a procedure under Article 7 TEU the Commission has 
to take into consideration the three possible outcomes 
of such a procedure: a) the Council/European Council 
will find a violation of Article 2 TEU (Commission 
‘gets it right’); b) the Commission’s initiative under 
Article 7 TEU will not find the necessary majority in 
the Council/European Council, in other words the 
Commission would be overdoing it (“false positive”1) 
and c) the Commission does not initiate an Article 7 
TEU procedure although the conditions for a violation 
of Article 2 TEU would have been fulfilled and the 
necessary majorities for Article 7 TEU could have been 
obtained (“false negative”). The present study gives 
examples for all three scenarios and illustrates their 
consequences. Due to the high probability of creating 
a “false positive” and its potentially far-reaching 
consequences, the decision to initiate an Article 7 TEU 
procedure must be taken with the utmost prudence2. 
The glass house argument used by some authors might 
plead also in favor of a very careful approach3. 
Without venturing into speculations what could be 
done de lege ferenda the present study is, in principle, 
limited to the situation of the law as it stands. 
I am grateful to the European Commission, in 
particular the Director General of its Legal Service, 
Luís Romero Requena, for having granted me leave 
for an academic year; to Brigid Laffan, the Director 
of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
for her interest in the topic and for the opportunity to 
organize a workshop on the ‘Rule of Law’ at the EUI 
in March 2016; to the speakers (María José Martínez 
Iglesias, Doyin Lawunmi, Jean-Baptiste Laignelot and 
Carlo Zadra) and participants in this workshop for 
giving me numerous ideas for my research; to Deirdre 
Curtin and Bruno de Witte for inviting me to present 
the topic of my research in their seminar on ‘Current 
Issues of EU-law’ and to the colleagues at the Robert 
Schuman Centre for fruitful discussions on an earlier 
outline. 
The opinions expressed in this study are the ones of 
the author and do not necessarily reflect positions of 
the European Commission or the European University 
Institute.
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BASIC ISSUES 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Issues of respect for the European Union’s fundamental 
values, in particular the Rule of Law, and their 
enforcement, have been at the centre of political and 
legal interest for some years now. Developments in 
several Member States, mainly in Hungary (from 
2010 on) and later in Poland (from end of 2015 on), 
have given rise to intense discussions as to their 
compatibility with the fundamental values of the 
European Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Those 
fundamental values include foremost the respect 
for human rights4, democracy and the Rule of Law. 
Indeed, in its second sentence Article 2 TEU states 
that these “values are common to the Member States 
in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail.” Article 7 TEU then provides 
for an enforcement mechanism in case of violations 
of those values. This provision is, however, highly 
complex. Thus, doubts concerning the efficiency of the 
‘Enforcement Mechanism’ provided for by Article 7 
TEU have been repeatedly voiced. Publications on the 
subject abound5.
The European Union’s institutions reacted quite 
diversely to the threats for the Rule of Law. Whereas 
the European Parliament called very early on for action 
regarding the ‘value crisis’6, the Council took much 
longer and suggested entering into an annual dialogue 
which addresses the Rule of Law7. The Commission, 
for its part, adopted a differentiated approach8. With 
regard to the problems raised in Hungary, it tackled 
the different threats to fundamental values (e.g.: 
independence of judges, media laws, independence of 
the data protection commissioner) separately. In some 
cases it initiated ‘isolated’ infringement procedures9, 
while in others it contented itself with mere warnings 
within the framework of an informal dialogue10. 
Sometimes such dialogues led to the desired outcome. 
Even when this was not the case, a formal Article 7 
TEU procedure has not been initiated yet, although 
the European Parliament asked the Commission to do 
so against Hungary11. A citizen’s initiative to this effect 
was accepted by the Commission in November 201512. 
On 23 June 2016 the initiators withdrew the initiative13.
With a view, then, to more efficiently addressing threats 
to the Rule of Law in the Member States, it adopted a 
‘Rule of Law Framework’ in March 2014 (‘Pre-Article 
7 TEU Procedure’). This Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure 
was criticised as being illegally adopted ‘ultra vires’14. 
When the Commission deployed the Pre-Article 7 
TEU Procedure for the first time in January 2016 with 
regard to the constitutional situation in Poland15, its 
approach was not unanimously welcomed16.
The present article cannot claim to provide a 
comprehensive overview of all issues on the Rule of 
Law raised in recent years. In the course of this research 
it has become obvious, though, that the understanding 
of the underlying issues concerning the Rule of Law 
and its protection in the European Union could 
benefit from a historical, comparative17 and inter-
disciplinary analysis. By placing specific problems in a 
wider context it aspires to present a clearer view of the 
issues at stake and of the risks involved due to a certain 
disconnection to the lived experience18. Historical 
and comparative experiences with the protection of 
the Rule of Law at national and at international level 
can help to understand the structure and objective of 
Articles 2 and 7 TEU and, hence, can be useful for their 
interpretation.  
Additionally, the article approaches the subject more 
broadly while at the same time more narrowly than 
previous research. More broadly, because it will place 
the protection of the Rule of Law at the level of the 
European Union in a historical and comparative 
context using not only legal but also political science 
research. Narrower because it will not attempt to 
provide for an all-encompassing analysis of all the 
minute elements of the Rule of Law but limit itself 
to just the core elements. This approach seems to be 
justified for the following reasons: first, since there is 
already considerable research upon which this article 
is built19; secondly, because Article 7 TEU does not 
provide for a mechanism to sanction each and every 
violation of any aspect of the Rule of Law. Indeed, it 
rather limits the European Union’s competences to 
‘serious’ breaches of the values mentioned in Article 2 
TEU. Narrower, because it will work very closely to the 
text of the relevant articles of the Treaties. In doing so, 
it will attempt to shed some light on the interpretation 
of the broad concepts used in Articles 2 and 7 TEU. In 
interpreting those provisions it will follow the classical 
approach to the interpretation of European Union law 
provisions. 
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The first part of the article takes a look at the wording 
of the Treaties regarding the protection of the Rule of 
Law and the European Union. Due to their degree of 
abstraction and complexity, they need to be understood 
and interpreted in a historical and comparative context.
The second part takes a look, firstly, at historic examples 
of homogeneity clauses and their enforcement in some 
multilevel systems of governance at a national level 
(using the examples of the United States of America, 
Canada, the Weimar Republic, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of Spain) 
and then at an international level (Council of Europe, 
regional international organisations in Latin America 
and Africa, Commonwealth of Nations). It will 
attempt to reply to the following questions: what are 
the main elements of the protection of the Rule of Law 
in those systems? What is their experience with rules 
on homogeneity20 and their enforcement (‘militant 
democracy’) in federal and quasi-federal States and in 
other international organisations21?
The third part applies the findings of the second part 
to the protection of the Rule of Law in the European 
Union. It initially examines the underlying reasons 
for the European Union to protect the Rule of Law 
(all affected principle; community based on trust; 
credibility inside and outside; transnational issues 
requiring transnational solutions). Secondly, it 
describes the roles of the European Union institutions 
in the protection of the Rule of Law (looking closely 
at the attributions of competences provided for by the 
Articles 14-19 TEU). Paying special attention to the 
roles European Union’s institutions have played in the 
protection of the Rule of Law up to now, it evaluates 
how far the criticism voiced in this regard is justified. 
Finally, and more prospectively, it examines how the 
European Court of Justice could play a more active role 
in the protection of the Rule of Law de lege lata.
II. THE RULE OF LAW IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
BASIC CONCEPTS
A. The Wording of Articles 2 
and 7 TEU 
Fundamental values of the European Union as listed in 
Article 2 TEU include democracy, fundamental rights 
and the Rule of Law. Democracy and the Rule of Law 
have a double character. Each of them is a fundamental 
value on its own account, at the same time they 
function also as instruments for the achievement of 
the other fundamental values, which are, in the end, 
synonymous with the common good22. All three major 
elements of Article 2 TEU are largely interdependent23. 
Amongst the fundamental values the Rule of Law is of 
particular importance, because it is perceived as the 
basic condition for ensuring democracy and human 
rights24. Also in the perception of citizens it stands out 
as being – together with free and fair elections – the 
most important aspect of democracy25. Therefore, the 
present research will expressly refer only to the Rule of 
Law and not the other fundamental values mentioned 
in Article 2 TEU, although it is to be understood that 
its basic findings are equally applicable to democracy 
and human rights. 
With regard to the protection of those values, Article 7 
TEU provides in its first paragraph a mere statement of 
a ‘clear risk’ of a ‘serious breach’ by a Member State of 
the values referred to in Article 2 TEU26. This statement 
is made by the Council, acting by a four-fifth majority 
of its members. The procedure can be initiated either 
by one third of the Member States, by the European 
Parliament or by the European Commission. At this 
stage, no sanctions are foreseen.
The procedure for the protection of those fundamental 
values is burdensome. The majorities required for 
decision-making under Article 7 TEU are particularly 
high (four-fifths of the members of the Council in the 
case of Article 7 (1) TEU and unanimity of members 
of the European Council in the case of Article 7 (2) 
TEU). The high level of abstraction of the fundamental 
values in Article 2 TEU might give the impression of a 
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tool which is rather blunt27. On the other hand, given 
the seriousness of the claims made against the Member 
State concerned, Article 7 TEU is frequently referred to 
as a ‘nuclear weapon’28.
Article 7(3) TEU allows for the suspension of voting 
rights only when the Member State is found in ‘serious 
and persistent breach of the values referred to in Article 
2 TEU’ (Article 7 (2) TEU). In this case it is either 
one-third of the Member States or the Commission 
that can initiate the procedure, and not the European 
Parliament. The European Council, comprising the 
Heads of State and Government, is competent for 
taking the decision on such a breach. It decides by 
unanimity after having obtained the consent of the 
European Parliament.
Procedurally, those strict majority requirements 
increase the likelihood for “false positives” 
tremendously. Those high procedural thresholds 
coupled with the relative vagueness of the terms used 
in Article 7 TEU and with the lack of precision of the 
fundamental values in Article 2 TEU already give the 
overall impression of a tool which is rather blunt. But 
that is not even the end of the story: 
When taking measures to protect the Rule of Law 
(and the other Fundamental Values), the EU has to 
respect the specific characteristics of the European 
Union and of European Union law resulting from its 
specific constitutional structure. Essential elements 
of this structure include the principle of conferral of 
powers referred to in Articles 4(1) TEU and 5(1) and 
(2) TEU, and the institutional framework established 
in Articles 13 TEU to 19 TEU29.
B. History and Comparative 
Law as important Tools 
for the Interpretation of 
Articles 2 and 7 TEU
For interpreting the broad and abstract concepts 
contained in Articles 2 and 7 TEU, I suggest following 
the classical rules on interpretation of European 
Union law. As the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
constantly held, “every provision of [EU] law must be 
placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the 
provisions of [EU] law as a whole, regard being had to 
the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution”30. In 
order to place the provisions of Articles 2 and 7 TEU 
in their context, I will initially examine the preamble of 
the TEU and then the relevant provisions of EU law as a 
whole. According to the European Court of Justice, the 
preamble of an act provides important information as 
to the interpretation of its provisions31. It refers to the 
preamble of legal acts when interpreting the intention 
of the legislator32 and the ‘general scheme’ of secondary 
legislation and international conventions.33
Given the abstract notions used in Article 2 TEU, a 
deeper understanding of the elements referred to in 
the preamble might prove particularly useful for its 
interpretation. 
The preamble expressly refers to the “cultural, religious 
and humanist inheritance of Europe”, from which the 
universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights 
of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality 
and the rule of law have developed. It is obvious that 
the European Union was built on a break from the 
past34. By referring to the ‘universal values’ in the 
context of the inheritance of Europe, it becomes clear 
that the historical dimension of the protection of the 
Rule of Law plays a crucial role in the interpretation 
and application of Articles 2 and 7 TEU.
There is more, however:  in the preamble, Member 
States have underlined the “historic importance of the 
ending of the division of the European continent and the 
need to create firm bases for the construction of the future 
Europe” (see 3rd paragraph of the Preamble to the TEU). 
Finally in its 4th paragraph the preamble confirms 
the Member States’ “attachment to the principles of 
liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law”. Member 
States have, therefore, renounced a ‘Westphalian’ 
interpretation of state sovereignty35, that is, one that 
was conceived to serve the interests of hereditary 
monarchies and “balkanized not only sovereignty but 
political legitimacy as well”36. The preamble of the TEU 
clearly indicates that the European Union wants to 
draw conclusions from Europe’s historical experiences 
which led to the horrors of the Holocaust, two World 
Wars and the subsequent division of Europe. Such 
conclusions cannot be based solely on blind faith in the 
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same formal, legal approaches that had formerly sent 
the whole continent into the abyss37. As Plunkett put 
it: the law, like all instruments, can be used for good or 
bad purposes38.
The understanding of the current rules on the protection 
of the Rule of Law in the European Union is dependent 
on other factors too. Those rules are based on previous 
experience in Europe and on other continents, in 
particular the US. The historic experiences of Europe 
are therefore in its DNA39. Europe does not invent 
itself. Since antiquity it has been based on human, 
sometimes inhuman, and political facts40. One of the 
lessons learned from those facts is that none of the 
empires created on European soil has endured. Indeed, 
many led to fratricidal conflict41. As the European 
Union breaks out of this classical scheme of alliances 
to pacify and unite the continent42, it is vital to see and 
understand the historical background of the provisions 
within its treaties. History gives the ‘raison d’être’ of the 
creation of such protection mechanisms designed to 
prevent the dismantling of a liberal-democratic system. 
Lessons can be learned from the mistakes of the past 
(“Those who do not learn history are doomed to repeat 
it.”). Also in this context it is essential not to adhere 
to a strictly national approach. European history is 
transnational history and its narratives can break the 
increased ‘self-reflexivity’ we can observe since the early 
years of the second decade of the 21st century43. A good 
example is the history of remembrance concerning the 
Holocaust and the Gulag memory since it could help 
understand the tension between national and supra-
national identity44. 
The examination of historic experiences serves well as 
a tool for the interpretation of rules. As we have seen, 
the preamble of the Treaty on European Union refers 
expressly to the “(…)cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe” as a source “for the universal 
values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the 
human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the 
rule of law.” Therefore, it seems to be entirely judicious 
to examine the inheritance. As Rosenfeld put it, “a 
European constitutional identity could easily ground 
its narrative of origins on a repudiation of Nazism and 
Soviet communism and on the need to create a political 
order that would minimize the chances of any return to 
tyrannical totalitarian rule.”45
Going back to the source of the European Union is 
essential in this moment of European history when 
the very need for European integration is put into 
question, when most Europeans have not experienced 
the ravages of the Second World War and when 
nationalism is gaining strength46. There is an identifiable 
risk that generations who have not lived through the 
Second World War may trivialise the dictatorships, 
even that of Germany with its own terrible history, 
of the first half of the 20th century47. Additionally, the 
new political leaders are mostly born after the Second 
World War and do not show the same enthusiasm 
for European integration as their predecessors48. This 
situation is aggravated by the fragility of democracies. 
Due to its very character, democracy is one of the most 
challenging forms of governments, and at the same 
time, it is more open to such risks49.
The understanding of the Rule of Law in the European 
Union is inspired by the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States and by international treaties50. Therefore 
we shall take a look at rules on values, homogeneity 
and their enforcement in other multi-layer systems 
and at historic examples of such practices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In his visionary and far-sighted51 Zürich speech 
delivered on 19 September 1946, Winston Churchill 
reminded us of the importance not only of the existence 
of values but on their defence. He pointed out that the 
League of Nations “did not fail because of its principles 
or conceptions. It failed because those principles were 
deserted by those states which brought it into being, 
because the governments of those states feared to face the 
facts and act while time remained. This disaster must 
not be repeated.”52.  This part of the speech sounds 
like a plea in favour of effective procedures to protect 
the basic values of any international organisation or 
federal state. They not only ensure a certain degree of 
homogeneity of the system but are often at the very 
heart of its ‘raison d’être’.
All ‘composed’ systems, whether they are federal 
or ‘quasi-federal’, require a certain degree of 
homogeneity53. Respect for this homogeneity by the 
‘composites’ is necessary for the proper functioning 
and even for the continued existence of any composed 
system54.  In light of the experience of the League of 
Nations and of the Weimar Republic, it does not come 
as a surprise that many other post-war international 
organisations and constitutions of federal states have 
not just contented themselves with homogeneity 
provisions but also provided for ‘defense mechanisms’. 
In this way they have usually aimed at protecting their 
very existence against destruction from the inside55. 
Effective constitutional instruments for the protection 
of the fundamental values are a necessary condition for 
the efficiency of a well-fortified democracy56. 
As will be shown in more detail below, this 
homogeneity is normally accompanied by the 
obligation of a certain federal loyalty (or Bundestreue, 
in German terminology). This latter is inherent to 
the principle of Unity which is the backbone of any 
system of ‘composed states’57. In the case of violation of 
such a federal loyalty clause, the system of composed 
states provides equally for a form of ‘coercion’ (or 
Bundeszwang)58. In the following chapter I shall briefly 
examine, firstly, the relevant provisions and practice 
in (quasi-) federal states (section II) and later in 
international organisations (section III).59
II. HOMOGENEITY CLAUSES 
IN (QUASI-)FEDERAL 
STATES 
A. Introduction
One might validly ask the question why it is useful to 
examine the provisions on the protection of the Rule of 
Law in federal states within the context of the European 
Union. Such an opposition to the European Union’s 
federal character seems particularly justified given that 
the European constitution was rejected. Indeed, in the 
current political climate,60 probabilities that it will be 
resuscitated are very low. Furthermore, by defining the 
European Union as a ‘Union of States and citizens’61, 
Article 4(2) TEU excludes the creation of a European 
Federal State62. Comparing the European Union with 
federal systems is, however, relevant since, in political 
science, the European Union is often referred to as an 
‘emerging federal system’63 with some legal scholars 
referring to the European Union as a ‘federally 
constituted entity beneath a state’64. Therefore we can 
compare the European Union to known entities within 
‘meaningful paradigms’65.
In my view such a comparison is also a useful exercise 
since (a) the European Union’s sui generis nature places 
it somewhere between an international organisation 
and a federal state66, (b) the introduction of Articles 2 
and 7 in the TEU was spurred by the accession of new 
Member States and fear for their political stability,67 
and (c) according to some authors, the European 
Court of Justice has in several recent cases followed the 
model of ‘homogeneity clauses’ in federal constitutions 
engaging in actions similar to those undertaken by 
federal states against its members68.  This last reason 
resembles, as we shall see in the following paragraphs, 
the motive for including provisions of so called ‘militant 
democracy’69 in the Basic Law. Its goal is to avoid the 
freedoms granted by the constitution being abused to 
the point of abolition and, in the end, the destruction 
of the democratic regime in its entirety70. This is one of 
the lessons learned from the overthrow of the Weimar 
Republic by Hitler and his followers71.
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Sweeping comparisons should, however, be avoided 
and all associations are to be made very cautiously. 
Additionally, it is difficult to establish a general theory 
of militant democracy due to the different solutions 
found in constitutional systems72. Nevertheless, some 
lessons can be learned from the past. The Weimar 
Republic is an instructive example in its mistakes and 
causes of negative developments in a federal system73. 
Theoretical articles at the time on how to protect 
the state as an institution were not lacking, nor were 
norms to this effect absent. One of the key issues was 
that the Weimar constitution was value-neutral74. That 
is, it was not considered to be unconstitutional to 
abolish democracy and the rule of law by a two-thirds’ 
majority in Parliament75. Therefore, the state as such 
was the object of the protection, not the values it was 
supposed to protect, promote and defend76. 
Some authors state that post-communist countries 
were more successful in establishing democratic 
institutions than in establishing a democratic culture, 
and describe those countries as ‘democracies without 
democrats’77. The same words were used to describe the 
situation in the Weimar Republic78. Similar remarks 
have been made about Europe. In the same vein, the 
President of the Commission, Jean-Claude Junker, has 
underlined that “[T] there is not enough Europe in this 
Union. And there is not enough Union in this Union;”79 
a statement quite close to the one on democracies 
without democrats. If we add to this picture the belief 
that ‘Europe was born in Auschwitz’80 it becomes 
obvious that an analysis of the reasons for including 
rules on militant democracy and their protection in 
federal constitutions can provide useful lessons for 
the understanding, interpretation and, ultimately, 
implementation of the rules on the protection of 
fundamental values in the TEU.
This finding is only part of the solution. To use Jean 
Monnet’s famous sentence: “Nothing is possible without 
men; nothing is lasting without institutions.” So what 
about the citizens? Tirole stated in an interview in 2015 
“…the European people are not ready to be European. I 
hope I am wrong because it’s depressing.”81 With regard 
to other young democracies such as Spain, educating 
the people in order to create a democratic culture has 
been considered to be the most important task of the 
state after the creation of a constitution82. But more 
established democracies such as the US83 or the Federal 
Republic of Germany84 are also facing the problem 
of ‘civic illiteracy’85. Education on the European 
dimension of democracy, the functioning of the state 
and the rights of the European citizens is largely absent 
in schools86. It is generally recognised that democracies 
need informed citizens, if the latter are outvoted 
by masses inflamed by populist statements, liberal 
democracy is at risk87. Therefore, legal measures need 
to be complemented with educational measures88.
It is interesting to note that such a lack of education 
among citizens leads to the increased appeal of political 
fringe parties such as the Front National, Fidesz, FPÖ 
or AfD. They appeal frequently more to emotions 
than to rational thinking. Loading the political 
discourse with emotions such as fear and anger is 
a characteristic of the extreme right and some leftist 
protest movements89. At the same time, it is obvious 
that it is essential to contain those emotions in order 
to provide for a truly inclusive democratic deliberation 
process90. Exchanging rational decision making with 
emotional government bears a striking resemblance 
to the situation in Europe in the interwar period. As a 
reaction to this phenomenon Loewenstein justified his 
appeal for militant democracy inter alia with ‘a super- 
session of constitutional government by emotional 
government’. In his view, constitutional government 
signifies the Rule of Law, which guarantees rationality 
and calculability of administration91, an opinion which 
is shared by many modern authors92. 
In the following sections I shall examine two different 
sets of rules: firstly those ensuring homogeneity within 
the federal system, for instance the supremacy of 
federal laws and fundamental constitutional values, 
and, secondly how those rules are implemented. I will 
concentrate my research principally on ‘horizontal 
rules’, i.e. the ones applicable between state authorities 
on a federal/sub-federal level, as opposed to ‘vertical’ 
rules, i.e. norms applicable between the state authorities 
and the citizens, aiming at the protection of the state 
against subversion. The latter are typical for a state and, 
therefore not directly covered by European Union law.
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B. Some examples for clauses 
on homogeneity and their 
enforcement in federal 
constitutions
It lies in the nature of political communities that they 
provide for instruments of internal intervention93. 
One of the plainest homogeneity clauses in federal 
constitutions is the one on the supremacy of federal 
laws over state laws. In general, federal constitutions 
stipulate that the federal rules prevail.
1. The United States of America
To use the example of the United States would be 
particularly illustrative since historically the US 
constitution was the first federal constitution94. Even 
more important than this historical aspect, however, 
is the fact that the US federal system served as an 
example for many systems, in particular with regard 
to the powers of the Supreme Court as a constitutional 
court, in Europe after the Second World War 95 and 
beyond (e.g. Australia96, Brazil97 and India98). Notably, 
the homogeneity clauses and their enforcement in the 
Basic Law were drafted according to the US model (see 
below). Recently, the Venice Commission provided 
another example for the particular relevance of the 
United States’ experience for the interpretation of the 
content of the Rule of Law: in its opinion of 11 March 
2016 on the situation in Poland, it quoted at length 
examples of the jurisprudence of the US Supreme 
Court99.
Homogeneity Clauses in the US 
Constitution
Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution is 
commonly referred to as the ‘Supremacy Clause’.   It 
establishes that the federal constitution and federal 
law generally take precedence over state laws, and even 
state constitutions100. Additionally, Article IV Section 
4 US guarantees the Republican form of government 
in the states101. Amendment XIV, which was integrated 
in 1868 after the Civil War, ensures that also the states 
respect fundamental rights and due process102. It 
ensures that the Federal Constitution and federal laws 
are supreme; therefore the federal state controls the 
states and not vice versa103. 
Enforcement of homogeneity 
Under the US Constitution, Congress can call forth 
the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress 
insurrection and repel invasion (Article I Section 
8). Article IV Section 4 US contemplates federal 
intervention104. Ensuring the faithful execution of the 
law is described as being the essence of the duties of 
the President of the United States of America105, or, 
in other words, the core constitutional duty of the 
president’s office106.  In the most extreme cases, the 
President of the United States of America can – as 
ultima ratio – ‘federalize the National guard in order to 
ensure the execution of the laws of the United States’107. 
Such cases, however, have been extremely rare108.
Examples for the enforcement 
of homogeneity – stand-off in 
Tuscaloosa
President Kennedy federalized the National guard in 
1963109 in order to enforce both the order of the court 
of 1 July 1955, in the case of Lucy v. Adams110, and 
also the order of United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama of 5 June 1963; both 
cases concerning the issue of ‘de-segregation’ of college 
education in Alabama. Specifically, the order enjoined 
the Governor of the State of Alabama from blocking 
the entry of Afro-American students to the campuses 
of the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa and 
Huntsville, Alabama. This led to a stand-off between 
State Troopers under the command of Governor 
Wallace and the federalized National Guard111. 
The stand-off in Tuscaloosa and Huntsville is a good 
illustration of how the Rule of Law, the protection of 
fundamental rights and the respect for constitutional 
checks and balances go together. It shows also that 
the application of homogeneity clauses can override 
the political decision by one democratically elected 
authority forming part of a multi-level system of 
governance. The executive, that is the President who 
wields the sword, and the judicial branch, disposing 
of the rational weapons of the words and tools for 
applying the interpretative methods of the law, work 
hand in hand for the protection of the common good 
and fundamental rights. As we know, such a coercive 
enforcement of  homogeneity clauses in the European 
Union is not possible (for more details, the reasons and 
consequences, see below Third Part).
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2. The Weimar Republic, in 
particular the reaction to the Beer 
Hall Putsch of November 1923
The Weimar Republic is a tragic and well documented 
example112 of the failure of a federal state, and one with 
the most horrendous of consequences. It teaches us 
what a polity must avoid if it wants to ensure its survival 
and the survival of its values. The Weimar Republic is 
an illustrative example of how to recognise the causes 
for negative developments in a federal system113. 
Homogeneity clauses 
In effect, Article 13 of the Weimar constitution 
stipulated the supremacy of Reich law over State law 
and established jurisdiction by the Reich Supreme 
Court for disputes on the matter114. 
Enforcement
Article 15 of the Weimar constitution gave the Reich 
government the power to supervise the execution of 
Reich laws and establish general directions. As ultima 
ratio, the Reich President (Article 48) had the power to 
use armed force to cause the Länder to oblige.
Problems
One of the key issues for the absence of a true defence 
of the Weimar Republic and its democratic model was 
that the Weimar constitution was value-neutral. As 
such, only the State was the object of the protection 
and not the values it was supposed to protect, promote 
and defend115.  Therefore, as Müller puts it correctly, it 
“had set no limits to political and legal changes enacted 
by the legislature”116. 
Another key reason for the failure of the Weimar 
Republic was the absence of democratic roots in 
society as a whole and, in particular, within both the 
power elite117 and the institutions of the State118.
Example: The case of the Beer Hall 
Putsch
According to Professor Weiler, “the European Union 
was built on the ashes of World War II”119. Other 
authors phrase it even more drastically: Europe “was 
born in Auschwitz”120. Europe in its current political 
form would not have come about without the horrors 
of the Second World War and the Holocaust. A pre-
condition for those horrors was the establishment of 
Nazi rule after 1933 in a formally and largely legal 
manner. But how could the Nazi Party and its leader 
gotten that far after the failed Putsch of November 
1923? As Loewenstein put it in his seminal article 
on ‘Militant Democracy’ in 1937: “The law for the 
protection of the Republic(…), was openly defied by 
Bavaria and secretly made blunt by hyper-legalistic, or 
even mutinous, courts from the beginning;…”121. 
In the following section I shall have a closer look at 
what Loewenstein meant by ‘open defiance’, how 
this open defiance was possible and analyse its 
consequences for the application of rules on ‘militant 
democracy’, such as the ones protecting the Rule of 
Law. In doing so, we shall see that, from a Rule of Law 
and from a homogeneity perspective, ‘Auschwitz’ was 
born in Munich. Bavaria and the Government of the 
Weimar Republic became the effective ‘midwives’ in 
this process by turning a blind eye to the most obvious 
violations of the Rule of Law and by not enforcing the 
‘homogeneity and protection clauses’ provided for by 
the laws of the Weimar Republic. Indeed, Bavaria had 
been a stronghold for the anti-democratic, nationalist 
Right and remained so after the unsuccessful Putsch of 
November 1923122and the Government of the Reich in 
Berlin lacked determination to counter those political 
tendencies in Bavaria.
The relevant facts of the unsuccessful Beer Hall Putsch 
can be summarised as follows123:  on 8 November 1923 
Hitler and his followers tried to seize power declaring 
that the Bavarian and Federal governments and 
President Ebert were deposed. Hitler and Ludendorff 
were then to constitute a provisional German National 
Government124. On the morning of 9 November 
1923 they marched with approximately 2000, mostly 
armed, supporters125 to the ‘Emperor’s Hall’ in Munich, 
their ultimate goal being a March on Berlin copying 
Mussolini’s march on Rome in October 1922126. In 
front of the residence of the Bavarian government they 
encountered police, who opened fire on them. The 
short-lived ‘putsch’ was suppressed by military and 
police forces and left several people  (12 Nazis and 4 
police officers127  - other sources speak of 4 policemen, 
15 Nazis and one innocent bystander128) dead. 
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These events led to a trial in Munich against Hitler 
and some of his co-putschists. Notwithstanding the 
intention to overthrow the government and the fatal 
consequences of the attempt to carry out the putsch, 
Hitler was only condemned to the minimum sentence 
of four years of imprisonment and released on parole 
after 8 months129. 
The trial did not deserve the name ‘court proceeding’130. 
‘Sham proceedings’ would be a more correct 
denomination131. The judges sympathised with the 
’putschists’ motives and allowed Hitler to turn the failed 
putsch – and the trial – into a propaganda victory132. 
Legal reasoning was suppressed in favour of political 
considerations. Judicial impartiality and respect for the 
law was completely amiss.
With reference to the ‘horizontal’ measures the flaws 
abounded: To cite only the most striking violations of 
the most fundamental legal principles in this case, the 
Munich court was not a competent tribunal; the trial 
should instead have taken place in front of a state court 
for the protection of the Republic in Leipzig which 
had been established by the law on the protection of 
the Republic of 21 July 1922133. This court had issued a 
warrant against Hitler and some of his followers which 
the Bavarian authorities ignored. The Bavarian Prime 
Minister declared that this law was not applicable in 
Bavaria since, in his view, it violated the rules on the 
distribution of competences between the Republic 
and the regions134. Out of political considerations, the 
government of the Republic did not use their powers 
to enforce the homogeneity clauses of Articles 15 and 
48 of the Weimar Constitution against Bavaria, as they 
had done previously in Saxony and Thuringia135. 
Hitler was an Austrian national. According to Article 9 
section 2 of the Law on the protection of the Republic, 
foreign nationals who committed crimes against the 
Republic were to be extradited. The provision did not 
allow for any discretion of the judge; the extradition was 
obligatory. Instead of being incarcerated and released 
in Germany, he should, therefore, have been extradited 
to Austria136. The ‘court’ based its completely arbitrary 
decision contra legem on entirely political grounds137. 
The judgment failed to mention that the ‘putschists’ 
had killed 4 police officers138.
Furthermore, the execution of the five years minimum 
sentence for high treason was suspended on probation 
after a mere 8 months. This early release was also 
entirely illegal. Hitler had been previously condemned 
for serious disturbance of the peace and had been 
released on probation until 1926, a period that was not 
to end till after the putsch took place. Consequently, 
the next sentence could not have been suspended 
on probation139. He should, therefore, have been 
incarcerated for at least five years and extradited to 
Austria.
How history would have unfolded if the competent 
court had judged the events of November 1923 and, 
consequently, Hitler had either been incarcerated until 
1929 and extradited to Austria or executed belongs 
to the sphere of speculation. What goes beyond mere 
speculation is the effect that the Putsch Trial had on 
the later provisions of the ‘well-fortified’ democracy in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, which I will shortly 
examine in the next section. It is undisputed, though, 
that his leadership was indispensable to the Nazi 
movement140.  Indeed, already during Hitler’s short 
imprisonment, the Nazi Party had fallen apart amidst 
rivalry between different groups141. Reuniting the Nazi 
movement after an interruption of five years would 
certainly have been at least considerably more difficult 
than doing so after an interruption that lasted merely 
8 months. Reuniting large parts of public opinion 
behind him would have been more difficult had he not 
had the stage of the ‘trial’ in 1924 where he managed to 
present himself as a victim rather than as a perpetrator 
of high treason and – at least - accessory to the death 
of four police officers142. Grabbing power in a formally 
legal manner as it happened in 1933143 would also have 
been an entirely different matter if he had been tried 
by the proper court in the proper manner144, convicted, 
sentenced and extradited according to the applicable 
law.
The formally legal power-grab in 1933 was only possible 
because the constitution of the Weimar Republic was 
value-neutral. The ‘trial’ in 1924 and subsequent lenient 
judgment were only possible since the Republic did 
not use its competences under the law on protection 
of the Republic and under Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution. Ironically, many commentators see the 
main reason for the later fall of the ‘Weimar Republic’ 
as the ‘over-use’ of exactly that same provision145. 
A case where a ‘false negative’ enabled ‘false positives’. 
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Lessons to be learned
The relevance of these events for the Rule of Law, for 
the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms 
and their actual employment is clear. We have shown 
that the Weimar Republic did not lack the mechanisms 
to protect itself from being overthrown146. The 
fundamental issue was rather that in the case of the 
Beer Hall Putsch they were not used, and when Hitler 
overused them later, he could not be opposed, since 
they were value-neutral.
A legal mechanism for ensuring the homogeneity 
of values is, therefore, only as strong as the resolve 
of the competent institutions to employ it to its full 
extent (virtue). The Weimar example also shows 
the potentially devastating consequences if political 
considerations take primacy over the strict application 
of legal rules in such fundamental areas as the 
protection of a democratic system’s integrity. The sham 
nature of the post-Putsch trial also exemplifies the need 
for judges to enjoy complete independence and show 
entire impartiality: ‘independence’ being understood 
as the absence of external influences that interfer with 
the judges’ neutrality, and ‘impartiality’ as the absence 
of similarly interfering internal factors.
The lessons drawn with respect to the ‘homogeneity’ 
clauses are basically twofold: first, that a ‘false negative’ 
can have devastating consequences; secondly, that 
clauses on the protection of a ‘Rule of law’ cannot be 
understood as being ‘value-neutral’; indeed, they need 
to be interpreted in the context of the protection of 
democracy and fundamental rights and, lastly, that the 
existence of enforcement mechanisms is not enough, 
it also takes the virtue of the responsible institutions 
to use them.    
3. The Federal Republic of 
Germany
Homogeneity clauses in the Basic Law 
of the Federal Republic of Germany147
The homogeneity clauses and their enforcement 
mechanisms in the Basic Law (BL) are based on the 
lessons learned from the traumatic experiences of the 
Weimar Republic148. As we have seen in the previous 
section, the helplessness of the Weimar Republic 
became evident during the ‘trial’ against Hitler and his 
followers in 1924149,  and continued in the wake of the 
seizure of power in 1933. 
Those who framed the BL were very well aware of the 
shortcomings of the Weimar Republic, drafting it with a 
view to establishing a democracy capable of defending 
itself150. To a large extent, the BL can be understood as 
a reaction to the defects of the Weimar Constitution151. 
Therefore, the homogeneity clauses and their 
supervision in the Federal Republic of Germany are 
of particular importance for understanding the Rule 
of Law instruments in the EU treaties. Historically, 
since they are based on the lessons learned from the 
disastrous shortcomings of the Weimar Republic’s 
constitution; politically, because the lessons learned 
from the ensuing catastrophe was the basis for the 
creation of the European Communities; empirically 
because the homogeneity clauses in the German Basic 
Law served as an example for similar clauses in many 
other constitutions of ‘new democracies’, such as Spain 
in 1978152  and some Central and Eastern European 
countries in the 1990s153. Additionally, the German 
doctrine on ‘Homogeneity’ is particularly extensive154.
Yet, examining the homogeneity clauses in the Federal 
Republic of Germany is also interesting from a 
different point of view. The western military governors 
determined the general principles necessary for the 
German constitution, reserving their right to approve 
its final draft155. Among other concerns, they were keen 
on ensuring that the German government exercised its 
rights in conformity with the Constitution, and, should 
this not be the case, they were determined to uphold 
security and preserve democracy by exercising full 
authority over the territory of the Federal Republic of 
Germany156. The draft of the Basic Law was approved 
by the Allies. Therefore they deemed that the German 
Constitution contained the necessary requirements for 
upholding security and preserving democracy, such 
as a powerful representation of the Länder (regions), 
a strong constitutional court and an apolitical civil 
service157. The importance of those conditions goes, 
therefore, far beyond the Parliamentary Council but 
express what the Western Allies considered important 
tools for avoiding another dictatorial power-grab. 
Historically speaking, the Bavarian constitution of 
1946, which was the first to refer expressly to the term 
‘Rechtsstaat’158, was largely drafted in exile by Wilhelm 
SECOND PART: 
Rules on values, homogeneity and their enforcement in other multi-layer systems18
Hoegner, a Bavarian lawyer and politician, who had 
heavily criticised the ‘Beer Hall’ trial as being a denial 
of justice and entirely scandalous159. After the war he 
became Prime minister of Bavaria and played a key 
role in the democratic reconstruction of that Land160.
In 1950 when ‘Rule of Law’ found its way into the 
preamble of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, only the Federal Republic of Germany 
mentioned the term expressly in its BL. By 2008, 
however, 15 out of 27 Member States had already 
expressly provided for the Rule of Law in their 
constitutions161.  
To come back to Germany: The historic second 
chance for Germany to build a democratic system of 
government is based on two pillars: a strong protection 
of the basic values, and respect for international 
obligations162 in particular the cooperation within the 
European Union163. Yet, according to some authors, 
the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court 
has a slightly ambivalent role in this ‘pillar structure’. 
Whereas with regard to the former (i.e. a well-fortified 
constitution), it has made a historical contribution in 
correcting the course of Germany’s Sonderweg and 
thus helped it return to the community of civilized 
nations and Western liberal democracies, with regard 
to the second pillar (European Unification) it has 
placed stumbling blocks in the path of history’s greatest 
effort to unify the liberal democracies of Europe164. 
The Court, to put it bluntly, might have corrected 
one Sonderweg only to launch another165. In a recent 
judgment on the binding effects of public international 
law a similar tendency can be observed166. It might well 
be, then, that this approach, brings to light that Carl 
Schmitt’s ‘long shadow’167 can still be felt.
The present analysis will briefly mention the main 
content of the Rule of Law in the BL and the mechanisms 
foreseen for their protection. Given the complexity of 
the topic, it will limit itself to the aspects relevant to 
the understanding of the system provided for by the 
EU Treaties. 
Basic considerations
Constitutional law must provide for the guarantee of 
its continued existence168. On the basis of historical 
experience, the awareness of this need is particularly 
high with regard to Germany. History also explains 
why the notion of the Rule of Law is a substantial 
one and not a merely formal concept169. The opposite 
opinion would ignore the lessons to be learned from 
the Weimar experience; lessons which adhered to the 
Schmitt-ian idea of a merely formal notion of the Rule 
of Law170 and the structure of the Basic Law itself. The 
Basic Law puts fundamental rights at the helm of the 
constitution. The protection of human dignity and the 
need for legality of the exercise of all state power and 
the Rule of Law are even rendered unamendable (cf. 
Article 79 section 3 BL). 
In the same vein, the principle of Democracy is not 
merely limited to periodic elections but a conscious 
decision in favour of substantial values171. Already 
the Greek philosophers were in agreement that it 
must avoid perverting itself into a dictatorship of the 
majority172.  As early as 1956 the Federal Constitutional 
Court found that political parties must combine respect 
for and the furtherance of pluralism and tolerance 
with the acceptance of certain inalienable values of 
the state173. It is interesting to note that, on the level of 
the European Union, Regulation No 1141/2014 of 22 
October 2014 on the statute and funding of European 
political parties and European political foundations 
contains a similar requirement for the recognition of a 
European political party174. In effect, in its Article 2 this 
regulation stipulates that a European political party 
“must observe, in particular in its programme and in its 
activities, the values on which the Union is founded, as 
expressed in Article 2 TEU, (…)”. It also contains certain 
sanctioning mechanisms175.
The state is obliged to protect an individual sphere 
of freedom and strive for substantive justice. The 
individual enjoys the protection of the courts176. The 
competences of the Federal Constitutional Court 
(FCC) played a pivotal role in achieving this purpose177. 
At the same time, this system must be ready to defend 
itself. By 1937 Loewenstein had already recognised that 
democracy “must be ready to fight in order to protect its 
very untouchable core against those forces which would 
destroy the very basis of its existence and justification”178. 
Thus, the BL was drafted in a manner to bring together 
the principles of democracy and Rule of Law which 
had not efficiently co-existed since 1848179.  
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Homogeneity clauses
The basic rule on material homogeneity180 in the Basic 
Law is Article 28 BL181. In essence, democracy and the 
Rule of Law are necessary elements of the constitutional 
order of the Länder (para. 1).  It reflects the basic 
principles applicable to the Federal State contained in 
Article 20, the so-called constitutional principles. With 
regard to implementation, the Federation guarantees 
respect for those requirements (Article 28 para. 3 BL).
The content of those principles becomes clearer when 
put in the context of the fundamental provision of 
Article 20 BL. This states inter alia that the Federal 
Republic of Germany is a democratic state. With regard 
to the Rule of Law it stipulates that the “legislature shall 
be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and 
the judiciary by law and justice.” In particular, Article 
20(3) BL establishes the Rule of Law principle. As a 
consequence of the strict positivism under the Weimar 
constitution, which led to the results described above, 
the executive and the judiciary are expressly bound not 
only by law but also by ‘justice’. This substantial concept 
of the Rule of Law under the Basic Law becomes even 
clearer when seen in the context of Article 1 BL, 
according to which human dignity shall be inviolable 
and that all state authority is obliged to respect and 
protect it.  
Article 31 BL contains a classic supremacy clause for 
federal law: “Federal law shall take precedence over Land 
law.” This supremacy clause serves as a barrier even for 
constitutional provisions of the Länder182. Altogether, 
these ‘homogeneity’ clauses lead to considerable 
uniformity with regard to the basic set up of the Länder 
in the FRG.183 
Enforcement 
After the Weimar experience, it comes as small surprise 
that the provisions for the enforcement of these 
‘homogeneity provisions’ are extremely elaborate. 
They range from appeals to the Federal Constitutional 
Court for federal oversight, a non-defined competence 
of ‘Federal coercion’ (according to Article 37 BL) to 
the (hypothetical) possibility of deploying the armed 
forces. The latter being a scenario which resembles the 
one used by President Kennedy in Alabama184. I will 
now look at these different mechanisms in turn. 
Article 84 (3) BL provides for Federal oversight of the 
Länder administration with a view to ensuring that 
“the Länder execute federal laws in accordance with 
the law. For this purpose the Federal Government may 
send commissioners to the highest Land authorities and, 
with their consent or, where such consent is refused, 
with the consent of the Bundesrat, also to subordinate 
authorities.” In case of persistence by the Land, the 
Federal Government needs the consent of the second 
chamber, the Bundesrat, for any further measures 
(Article 84(a) and (5) BL). 
The main implementation mechanism for these 
homogeneity clauses and competences is Article 37 
BL (‘Federal Coercion’). In cases where a Land fails to 
comply with its obligations under the Basic Law or other 
federal laws, the Federal Government is empowered to 
take the necessary steps to compel the Land to comply 
with its duties. Before the Federal Government can act 
under Article 37(1) BL, it has to obtain the consent of 
the second chamber, the Bundesrat. For the purpose 
of implementing such coercive measures, the Federal 
Government or its representative shall have the right 
to issue instructions to all Länder and their authorities 
(Article 37(2) BL).
Although this article has never been used it is still an 
important provision due to its dissuasive effects on 
possibly ‘recalcitrant’ Länder185. It is understood as an 
ultima ratio, which is generally understood as requiring 
a prior request to the FCC186 although formally a prior 
appeal to the FCC is not necessary187. Procedurally, 
the Federal Government has to state the violation, 
decide on the use of the Federal Execution, define 
the measures to be taken, obtain the agreement of the 
Bundesrat (2nd chamber of Parliament) and then apply 
the measure. According to the FCC’s jurisprudence, the 
proportionality principle as a concretisation of the Rule 
of Law is not applicable between state authorities188.
In the context of European Union action under Article 
7 TEU, the situation would be different. The use of 
all Union competences is governed by the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 5 TEU). 
Therefore, the Union has to respect the principle of 
proportionality also in its - horizontal - relations with 
the Member States189.
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The Basic Law puts fundamental rights at the helm of 
the constitution. The protection of human dignity, the 
need for legality (in the broad, substantive sense) in 
the exercising of all state power, the federal system and 
the Rule of Law are all, as fundamental principles, even 
rendered unamendable (cf. Article 79(3) BL). All these 
innovations can be understood as a reaction to the 
negative experiences of the Weimar Constitution190. 
Article 79(3) BL was, therefore, meant to constitute a 
protection against a coup d’état from the inside191. All 
the more surprising is that since its seminal Maastricht 
judgment, the Federal Constitutional Court has 
interpreted this provision in a way that is directed 
towards the outside, thereby, effectively putting a brake 
on further EU integration.  
Another tool for ensuring homogeneity in the Federal 
Republic of Germany lies in the competence of the 
Federal Constitutional Court for deciding in cases 
of conflicts between the Federal Government and 
the Länder. Such cases concern, in particular, the 
compatibility of federal law or Land law with the Basic 
Law, the compatibility of Land law with other federal 
law, or else disagreements concerning the rights and 
duties of the Federation and the Länder (Article 93(1) 
and (2) BL).
Similar to the relevant provisions in US legislation, the 
BL allows for the employment of armed forces in case 
of any risk to the fundamental values. It is interesting 
to note that this option is open either, upon request, 
to the Land in question or, if that party is unable or 
unwilling to make such a request, to the Federal 
Government (Article 87a BL). As a safeguard against 
abuse, the Federal Parliament and the second chamber 
can veto the action which then has to be discontinued.
4. Spain
In Spain, the transition to a democratic system was 
accompanied by a process of decentralisation granting 
a high degree of autonomy to the Comunidades 
Autónomas 192.
Homogeneity clauses
The Spanish Constitution (SC) contains a number of 
clauses which ensure homogeneity193. Nevertheless, 
in its judgment of 25 March 2014, the Spanish 
constitutional court found that Spain is not a militant 
democracy194. Together with the judgement of 2 
December 2015, it provides some interesting insights 
into the relationship between democracy and the 
Rule of Law and the Spanish Constitutional Court’s 
understanding of the defence mechanisms contained 
in the Spanish Constitution. Therefore the relevant 
passages of those judgments merit a closer analysis.
The judgment of 25 March 2014 underlined the 
importance of the legality principle and the supremacy 
of the constitution over general laws. Any state activity 
must respect “democratic principles, fundamental 
rights or all other constitutional mandates, and its 
effective achievement follows the procedures foreseen for 
constitutional reform (…)”195.
On a procedural note, the Spanish Constitutional 
Court makes clear that the Legislative Assembly of an 
Autonomous Community has to respect the “duty of 
reciprocal assistance”, “reciprocal support and mutual 
loyalty”, “constituting in turn the broadest duty of 
loyalty to the Constitution”. The Spanish Parliament 
would therefore have to consider any application 
made according to the rules for constitutional reform 
(Articles 87(2) and 166 SC)196. 
In a more recent decision197, the Spanish Constitutional 
Court clarifies the idea further:
“in a constitutional state, the democratic 
principle cannot be detached from the 
unconditional primacy of the constitution. 
The latter requires that all decisions de iure 
imperii are, without exception, subject to the 
constitution. In this respect the constitution does 
not grant any freedom to Public authorities or 
spaces of immunity.”
“When exercising its task as supreme interpreter 
of the Constitution it (i.e. the Constitutional 
Court) must ensure that the use of the constituted 
authority power respects the limits drawn by the 
constituent authority”198
In point 5 of the same judgment, the Spanish 
constitutional court declares that the resolution 
of the Catalan Parliament in question cannot be 
based on democratic legitimacy of the Autonomous 
Community, and that is in absolute contradiction with 
SECOND PART: 
Rules on values, homogeneity and their enforcement in other multi-layer systems21
the constitution and the Autonomy Statute of said 
Autonomous Community. It finds that the resolution 
disrespects not only the requirements of the Rule of 
Law, which require full submission to the laws and the 
Law, but also its own democratic legitimacy, which the 
Constitution recognises and protects.
The legitimacy of an act by a public authority or a 
public policy relies, in principle, on its conformity 
with the constitution and the legal system. Without 
this conformity there is no legitimacy. According to 
the democratic concept of power, the Constitution 
transmits the highest legitimacy. The Constitutional 
Court therefore sees the democratic principle as a 
superior value with regard to the Constitution (Article 
1.1 SC). This principle has to be construed in the 
context of the constitutional order and its processes. 
The unconditional supremacy of the Constitution is 
the source of democracy’s legitimacy and, by providing 
for special procedures for amendments, of its content. 
Under point 5 b), the Constitutional Court explains 
that the Spanish Constitution is based inter alia on 
the values of human dignity, democracy, the Rule of 
Law and fundamental rights. It concludes that the 
democratic principle must be interpreted in light of 
its position within the whole constitutional system. 
The legal system with the constitution at its helm 
cannot be seen as limiting but has to be understood as 
guaranteeing democracy199. It was, after all, approved 
by the people when they voted in favour of the 
constitution.
In contrast to the German Basic Law, the Spanish 
Constitution does not contain ‘eternity clauses’200. 
Complete revisions are therefore theoretically possible. 
At the same time, such a complete revision would 
need to respect the procedural rules for reforming 
the constitution. If this were not the case, the public 
authorities would create a free space outside the Law 
which would, in turn, lead to irreparable damage to the 
citizens’ freedom201. 
The Spanish Constitutional Court therefore follows 
a concept of the Rule of Law which is similar to the 
one adhered to by the European Court of Justice. 
It understands the Rule of Law and Democracy as 
inalienable preconditions for the protection of the 
fundamental rights of citizens202. It is interesting 
to note that the Spanish Constitutional Court uses 
exactly the same terminology as the first paragraph of 
the preamble of the TEU203.
This jurisprudence of the Spanish Constitutional 
Court allows the following conclusions to be drawn: a) 
in contrast to the Basic Law, the Spanish Constitution 
does not contain an ‘eternity clause’ but b) it subjects 
any revision to the respect of the constitutionally 
foreseen procedures. These act, at the same time, 
as guarantors of the respect for the Rule of Law and 
Democracy; the latter covering on the one hand, the 
democratic will on the national level, i.e. the Spanish 
people as a whole, and on the other, as legally distinct, 
the democratic will expressed by the people of Spain as 
the ‘pouvoir constituant’, to which all authorities of the 
state are subjected. The constitutional court supervises 
the respect of those provisions. Therefore, the Spanish 
constitution indeed defends itself against illicit reforms 
but does not contain an inviolable core of principles. At 
the same time, it ensures that the principle of the rule 
of Law is observed by all expressions of state authority. 
Enforcement
As we have seen in the previous section under the 
Spanish constitutional system it is, in the first place, 
the Spanish Constitutional Court that ensures that 
‘homogeneity’ clauses are respected. For this purpose, 
Article 161(2) SC provides locus standi for the 
Central Government to bring a challenge before the 
Constitutional Court against “enactments without 
force of law”, and “decisions of the Autonomous 
Communities”. In case the ensuing judgment should 
not be respected, Article 155 SC provides for an 
additional enforcement mechanism204.
Article 155
1. If an Autonomous Community does not 
fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the 
Constitution or other laws, or acts in a way 
seriously prejudicing the general interests 
of Spain, the Government, after lodging a 
complaint with the President of the Autonomous 
Com munity and failing to receive satisfaction 
therefore, may, following approval granted by 
an absolute majority of the Senate, take the 
measures necessary in order to compel the latter 
forcibly to meet said obligations, or in order to 
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protect the above-mentioned general interests. 
2. With a view to implementing the measures 
provided in the fore going clause, the Government 
may issue instructions to all the authori ties of 
the Autonomous Communities.205 (emphasis 
added)
The leading commentary on the Spanish Constitution 
states expressly that this provision was drafted with 
Article 37 BL206 in mind. Following this model, 
the Spanish constitution, contrary to the Italian 
constitution (see below) does not specify the means to 
be employed by the central government. Contrary to 
Article 37 BL, the Spanish doctrine is quasi unanimous 
in upholding that the central government has to 
respect the principle of proportionality when applying 
Article 155 SC207. Therefore, the means to be employed 
are limited by these concepts, which explains why the 
use of the armed forces would be, largely excluded208. 
Also the Spanish doctrine considers this article as an 
ultima ratio209. In contrast to Article 37 BL, the situation 
in question must, according to leading Spanish 
constitutional lawyers, seriously endanger the general 
interests of the nation, and a mere disrespect for the 
law is not sufficient210. Up to now this mechanism has 
never been used, either in Germany or in Spain211. In 
a conflict with the Canary Islands in 1989 concerning 
fiscal obligations of EU law, the central government 
threatened with the application of Art. 155 SC. In the 
end, the conflict could be resolved without formally 
using the enforcement mechanism212. 
Should the central government intend to use 
Article 155 SC, it is obliged to give the Autonomous 
Community’s President a final warning, the purpose 
of which is to allow the Autonomous Community to 
meet the obligations on its own initiative.213 Should 
the Autonomous Community not oblige, the Central 
government can, after approval of the Senate, give direct 
instructions to its authorities, thereby amounting to a 
de facto replacement of the Autonomous Community’s 
government214. The Central government can also take 
economic measures such as the blocking of funds. 
Procedurally, however, the Central government can 
only take measures which are approved by the Senate. 
Without such an authorisation the acts in question 
would be taken ultra vires and could be challenged215. 
According to constitutional experts, Article 155 SC 
is an exceptional tool which aims to remedy extreme 
situations. It covers situations where an Autonomous 
Community disrespects the constitution and seriously 
violates the general interest of the State216. Formally, 
a prior application to the Constitutional Court is 
not necessary although with an eye to respecting the 
principle of loyal cooperation and proportionality 
some authors deem it preferable217 others necessary218. 
Parts of the academic literature classify the decisions as 
to whether or not the general interests of the State are 
seriously violated as a ‘substantially political decision’219 
others underline at the same time the political character 
must be limited by constitutional considerations220. 
Others underline that the general interest of the state 
refers to respect for constitutional concepts221, also 
qualitative elements such as the knowledge of the 
violation, its repetitive character and the intention to 
undermine the distribution of competences as foreseen 
by the Constitution are suggested222. Those attempts to 
underline the exceptional character lead to a situation 
that its application becomes more difficult and the 
concepts less clear. This situation resembles the one that 
the EU institutions are facing with regard to Article 7 
TEU223. The application of Article 155 SC is controlled 
initially by the involvement of both chambers of 
Parliament, and subsequently by the Constitutional 
Court by means of a ‘conflict of competence procedure’ 
under Article 161(1) let. c)  SC224.
Similar to the description reserved for Article 7 TEU 
as the ‘nuclear option’, Article 155 SC is referred to as 
the most explosive article of the Spanish Constitution, 
and one which should be used with great political 
caution225. 
5. Italy
Homogeneity clauses
The Italian constitution of 1999 (IC) contains several 
homogeneity provisions226. Similar to the system of 
Article 4 TEU, Article 120 para. 4 IC obliges the State 
and the Regions to respect the principles of subsidiarity 
and loyal cooperation. Thus, regional statutes have to 
comply with the constitution (Article 123 IC). 
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Enforcement of homogeneity clauses
The following enforcement provisions are particularly 
relevant: Article 120 para. 3 IC provides that the State 
can act for regional and municipal bodies inter alia 
“whenever such action is necessary to preserve legal or 
economic unity”. The national government has standing 
before the Constitutional Court when it deems that 
the regional law exceeds the competence of the 
Region (Article 127 para. 1 IC). However, a region can 
challenge a state or regional law, when it is deemed that 
that said law or measure infringes upon its competence 
(Article 127 par. 1 IC). Meanwhile, article 126 IC is 
a particularly interesting provision since it refers, 
like Article 7 TEU, to ‘grave violations of the law’. In 
such cases it provides for a quite radical measure to 
ensure homogeneity. According to Article 126 IC, in 
the case of acts in conflict with the Constitution or 
displaying grave violations of the law, the President of 
the Republic may dissolve the Regional Council and 
remove the President of the Executive by reasoned 
decree. Before adopting such a decree though, the 
President has to consult with a committee of Deputies 
and Senators for regional affairs which is set up in 
the manner established by a law of the Republic. The 
Italian Constitutional Court has clarified the scope of 
these provisions in its judgement of 16 July 2013227.
Article 126 IC reflects the division of competences and 
responsibilities as intended by the pouvoir constituant. 
For this purpose, it establishes the pre-conditions 
for dissolution of the regional council as well as the 
competent institutions. It also ensures the compatibility 
of two essential aspects of the Italian constitution: 
that the Italian Republic is on the one hand, a ‘state of 
regions’ and, on the other, it is united and indivisibile. 
(Article 5 IC)228. Art 126 of the Italian Constitution, 
meanwhile, covers only truly exceptional situations. It 
cannot be applied when exercising political discretion 
but merely in situations of serious violations of specific 
legal obligations which encroach upon the regional 
system, as established by the Constitution or by the 
laws of the Italian Republic229. 
Regional autonomy does not entail the right to deviate 
from the common path traced by the Constitution 
as this relies on the sharing of values and principles 
independently from the territorial dimension230. The 
Italian Constitution has the power vested in it of 
ensuring the legal and economic unity of Italy in the 
Republic231. When exercising the powers granted by 
Article 126 IC, the government of the Republic enjoys 
certain discretion, notably as to whether violations of 
the law are indeed “grave”. The President of the Republic 
is competent for the dissolution though he can only act 
upon a proposal adopted by the Head of Government, 
which has been previously discussed by the Committee 
referred to in Article 126232. The President represents 
national unity whereas the Head of Government 
determines the general political guidelines233. Already 
in a judgment prior to the one just discussed, the 
Italian Constitutional Court had underlined the crucial 
role of the Republic’s government in the process234. 
Article 126 IC obliges the Government to motivate the 
decree dissolving the Regional Council with a view to 
ensuring cohesion and the harmonious functioning of 
the authorities of the regions and the Republic which 
form the constitutional structure of the Republic235.
6. Brief overview of homogeneity 
clauses and their enforcement in 
other federal systems
6.1 Canada 
• Canadian federalism has drawn comparisons with 
the European Union236. Due in particular to the 
secession movement in Quebec, Canada is familiar 
with tensions between cooperative federalism and 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which is 
one of the central points in the current debate on 
the Polish constitutional crisis237. 
• In quite similar fashion to the German system, the 
Canadian State is based on four fundamental and 
organisational principles: federalism, democracy, 
constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law238.  
• In 1998 the Supreme Court of Canada was asked 
whether Quebec could unilaterally secede from 
Canada. The Court said ‘no’: the principle of the 
rule of law requires that a government, even one 
mandated by a popular majority in a referendum, 
must still obey the rules of the Constitution. It 
stated in very clear terms:
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“The democratic vote, by however strong a 
majority, would have no legal effect on its 
own and could not push aside the principles 
of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of 
individuals and minorities, or the operation 
of democracy in the other provinces or in 
Canada as a whole.  Democratic rights under 
the Constitution cannot be divorced from 
constitutional obligations.”239
• This Constitution stipulates the procedures for its 
own amendment, and those procedures must be 
followed for the secession of a province. Indeed, 
those procedures are important in safeguarding 
the interests of dissenting minorities within the 
province, not to mention the interests of the rest 
of Canada, which would be profoundly affected by 
secession240. 
• On a comparative note, it is interesting to see that, 
the Spanish Constitution Court, when faced with a 
similar situation with regard to Spain and Cataluña 
(see above), followed the same line of argument 
the Canadian Constitutional Court had employed 
17 years earlier.
6.2 Australia
The Australian federal system is largely influenced by 
the US Constitution241. The Australian Constitution 
established the supremacy of the laws of the 
Commonwealth in the following terms:
Section 109 – Inconsistency of laws
When a law of a State is inconsistent with a 
law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall 
prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be invalid. 242 
At a federal level, the principle of the Rule of Law 
transfers responsibility for interpreting that legislation 
and assessing whether it is within the guidelines 
established by the Constitution ultimately to the 
High Court243. The Australian federal system does not 
provide for any other of the safeguards of a well-fortified 
democracy. Executive action dominates the field in 
this respect244. Nevertheless, the Australian High Court 
found in one of its landmark cases concerning the ban 
of the Communist Party that the Commonwealth 
had an implied legislative power to protect itself from 
‘subversion’245. At the same time, the legislator could 
not simply dissolve the Communist Party, against 
which the executive action had been directed, before it 
had been declared guilty of subversion by the courts246.
6.3 Switzerland
The Swiss Constitution (CHC) contains in its Article 
5 para. 1 a direct reference to the Rule of Law: “All 
activities of the state are based on and limited by law.” 
With regard to homogeneity Article 46, the CHC 
obliges the Swiss cantons to implement federal law in 
accordance with the Federal Constitution and federal 
legislation. Article 49 CHC contains in para.1(a) a 
classic supremacy clause while para. 2 empowers the 
Confederation to ensure that the cantons comply with 
federal law.
Cantonal constitutions must be democratic and fall in 
line with federal law. The Confederation guarantees 
respect for both requirements (Article 51 paras. 1 and 
2 CHC). Institutionally, the power to takie measures to 
enforce federal law is vested in the Federal Assembly 
(Article 173 para. 1 (e) CHC).  
C. Conclusions
We have seen in this section that many federal systems 
provide for homogeneity clauses with regard to 
Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law. At the 
same time, the requirements for ‘federal intervention’ 
used in federal constitutions such as those in Italy or 
in Spain (‘Seriously prejudicing’, ‘grave violations’) are 
no more precise than the ones used in Article 7 TEU. 
A certain vagueness of the terms seems to be inherent 
in cases of grave constitutional crisis. Criticism of this 
aspect of Article 7 TEU could also, therefore, be voiced 
against several federal constitutions.
Commentators on most of the relevant provisions also 
agree that triggering the enforcement mechanisms 
provided by national constitutions is largely a political 
decision. In federal systems, with the exception of the 
US, such a decision has not been taken. This proves 
that on the national level such measures are the ‘ultima 
ratio’ for ensuring homogeneity.  Federal systems are 
very cautious not to create ‘false positives’; therefore 
they prefer generally to solve problematic situations 
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concerning their fundamental values in informal ways. 
In case they opt for enforcement, the case of Governor 
Wallace shows that they must be ready to go the whole 
way, meaning until the threat or even the use of force 
– an option which the European Union obviously does 
not have at its disposal. This finding pleads in favour 
of a very cautious approach also on the level of the 
European Union. 
III. HOMOGENEITY 
CLAUSES AND THEIR 
ENFORCEMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS
A. Introduction
Regional international organisations provide for 
homogeneity clauses for similar reasons as federal 
systems. A minimum degree of homogeneity is 
essential for the proper functioning and even for the 
very existence of a multi-level system be it on a national 
or international level247. 
In the post-war period, many states had drawn 
conclusions from the lessons taught by the bad 
experiences of the inter-war period and became 
‘Militant Democracies’.  In many cases, in particular in 
new democracies in Latin America, similar strategies 
were followed at the level of regional international 
organisations. Ratione temporis, these events took 
place in particular after the fall of the Wall, “when 
democracy and integration intertwined”248.  
Almost at the same time, a homogeneity clause was 
discussed at the European level. This phenomenon is 
generally understood as expressing a certain level of 
distrust of the ‘new democracies’ which had formerly 
been behind the Iron Curtain. It should not be forgotten, 
however, that these events also coincided with granting 
the Federal Republic of Germany its full sovereignty. 
In the ‘Two-Plus-Four-Treaty’ ending formally the 
prerogatives of the allied forces over Germany in 1990, 
the Allies underlined the importance of Germany’s 
integration into the European Union249. Establishing 
safety mechanisms in the European Treaties can, 
therefore, as well be understood as an attempt to 
cement newly sovereign Germany’s attachment to the 
fundamental values. On a general scale it would be 
arrogant and complacent to speak about a completely 
stable democracy250.
The end of the Cold War also had an important impact 
on the rise of liberal democracies in Latin America251 
and of the democratic process in Africa252. It was 
described as a “second independence”253. The fall of 
the military regimes in the 1980s and the end of the 
Cold War were decisive events in the establishment 
of a better protection for democracy254. Possible 
attacks on liberal democracy show similar features. In 
Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe (for 
examples, see below in the Third Part) governments 
attempt to control the media. In both regions, certain 
governments have developed policies aiming at 
strengthening the communication hegemony of the 
executive255.
The examples of Latin America are therefore useful 
in order to analyse the gap between public discourse 
and policies on the ground256 which can also be found 
in Member States of the EU. In Latin America and in 
some Central and Eastern European countries media 
polarisation has led to situations where new elites have 
replaced a traditional private hegemony with a public 
one and tried to impose their points of view on the 
public whilst pretending to defend the democratic will 
of the people257. In terms of the rhetoric used, parallels 
are abundant, especially in their common appeals to 
emotions rather than to rational reasoning. The result 
might be considered, in the terms Loewenstein used 
already in 1937 (see above in this Part) ‘a superseding 
of constitutional government by emotional government’. 
Constitutional government signifies the Rule of Law, 
which guarantees rationality and calculability of 
administration258. Emotionalising political discourse 
via the media can easily be used for anti-democratic 
purposes259. It offers easy solutions by dividing the world 
between ‘friend and foe’ as exemplified by Carl Schmitt 
with the horrendous consequences described earlier 
(see part II above). According to some studies, leftist 
governments260 and more right wing governments for 
example in Hungary and in Poland261 employ similar 
bipolar rhetoric. 
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Another important parallel between ‘new democracies’ 
in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe 
merit special attention: in both regions the executive 
‘cracks down on non-compliant judges’262. Such 
activities by the executive, be it in the form of polemic 
criticism of judgments, personal attacks on judges263 
or replacement of ‘non-complacent’ judges, is an 
important indicator of a governments true respect for 
the Rule of Law264 or, respectively, the lack of it.
With regard to constitutional policy, some Latin 
American constitutions contain far-reaching social, 
cultural and economic rights. These constitutional 
stipulations have a considerable influence on 
constitutional stability and, in the end, on the Rule of 
Law. Different governments pursue different objectives 
in this respect. Therefore, legal reformism also 
captures the constitution and leads to a politicisation 
of constitutionalism265. In Hungary, the constitution 
was also used as an ‘instrument of Everyday Party 
Politics’266, whilst in Poland, the change in government 
led to a flurry of amendments to constitutionally 
relevant laws267.
These approaches contrast sharply with the modern 
or Kantian understanding of democracy. Democracy 
in the broadest sense is more and more understood 
to be a ‘global good’ which should be protected by 
international organisations268. In this way it will 
be possible to counter national anti-democratic 
tendencies269. Such a tendency grew particularly 
strong in the last decade of the 20th century270 with 
von Bogdandy observing that “sovereignty used to be 
like one house alone on a big plot, nowadays it is the 
ownership of an apartment in a building with 200 
units.”271 Regarded from the perspective of evolution 
theory it is a very recent phenomenon272.
B. Regional International 
Organisations 
1. The Council of Europe
Introduction
The Council of Europe is of particular importance 
for the understanding of the system of the European 
Union273. With the exception of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, all founding members of the European 
Economic Community were founding members of 
the Council of Europe274. Currently all members of the 
European Union are equally members of the Council 
of Europe.
The Council (of the European Union) underlined 
that “the Council of Europe will remain the benchmark 
for human rights, the rule of law and democracy in 
Europe”275 and referred to the 2007 Memorandum of 
Understanding between the European Union and the 
Council of Europe276.
In its Rule of Law Framework Communication of 
2014277, as well as in the first case of its application 
regarding Poland278, the Commission has underlined 
the importance of the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission for the evaluation of a possible violation 
of the Rule of Law as well as for the definition of the 
elements of the Rule of Law under the EU-Treaties279. 
Also the academic literature pleads in favour of using 
the Venice Commission’s experience280.Therefore, 
the relevant provisions of the Statute of the Council 
of Europe are of particular importance for the 
understanding of Articles 2 and 7 TEU. 
Homogeneity clause
The Statute of the Council of Europe (StCoE) is an 
example of decoupling democracy and Rule of Law. The 
principle of democracy is mentioned in its preamble. 
The article on ‘homogeneity’, Article 3 StCoE refers 
expressly only to the Rule of Law and to human rights 
and fundamental liberties. The relevant provisions of 
the Statute of the Council of Europe read as follows281:
“Preamble:
(…)
Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and 
moral values which are the common heritage of 
their peoples and the true source of individual 
freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, 
principles which form the basis of all genuine 
democracy; 
(…)
Chapter I – Aim of the Council of Europe 
Article 1 
The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve 
a greater unity between its members for the 
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purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals 
and principles which are their common heritage 
and facilitating their economic and social 
progress. 
 (…)
Article 3: 
Every member of the Council of Europe must 
accept the principles of the rule of law and of the 
enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the 
realisation of the aim of the Council as specified 
in Chapter I.”
The Council of Europe follows a substantial concept 
of the Rule of Law. It considers the Rule of Law as a 
‘fundamental ingredient of any democratic society’282.
Enforcement
Similar to Article 7 TEU, the Council of Europe 
mechanism has been criticised as not being effective 
due to its radical character and ‘questionable usefulness’ 
in the protection of human rights283. In case of serious 
violations of the principles of Article 3 StCoE, sanctions 
are provided for by Article 8.
Article 8 
Any member of the Council of Europe which has 
seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended 
from its rights of representation and requested 
by the Committee of Ministers to withdraw 
under Article 7. If such member does not comply 
with this request, the Committee may decide 
that it has ceased to be a member of the Council 
as from such date as the Committee may 
determine.  (Emphasis added)
This article, regarding possible suspension in the case of 
serious violation of principles, does not refer explicitly 
to democracy, whereas the preamble establishes a 
direct link between fundamental rights, the Rule of 
Law and ‘genuine’ democracy284.
Similar to the system provided for by Article 7 TEU, 
only ‘serious’ violations can trigger the application 
of sanctions. The Member State concerned can be 
excluded from the Council of Europe if it does not 
follow up on the request to exit on its own initiative. 
According to Article 20(d) StCoE, such a decision 
requires a double majority: 2/3 of votes cast and a 
simple majority of those members who have the 
right to vote. The majority requirements are therefore 
considerably lower than in the case of Article 7 TEU.
Examples
As of mid-March 2016 this procedure has only been 
used twice. When Greece was ruled by the ‘Colonels’, 
the Council of Europe threatened to expel her, but 
Greece withdrew from the Council of Europe before 
the threat could materialize285. Then, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) excluded 
the members of the Russian Federation after the 
annexation of the Crimea and in light of Russia’s role 
in the conflict in Ukraine. The assembly condemned 
the 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine and 
voted to suspend inter alia the Russian delegation’s 
voting rights in the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary 
Assembly from 10 April 2014 onwards. The suspension 
of Russia has so far been limited to PACE activities, 
and does not affect the Russian delegation in the 
second statutory political body of the Council of 
Europe, the Committee of Ministers. On 4 June 2014, 
Russia suspended its cooperation with PACE since its 
delegates had been deprived of voting rights in the 
aftermath of the Ukrainian conflict. On 28 January 
2015 PACE decided to renew the suspension of the 
Russian delegation’s voting rights and its right to be 
represented in the Assembly’s leading bodies. By this, 
it understood such sanctions to be “a clear expression 
of condemnation of continuing grave violations of 
international law in respect of Ukraine” by Russia.286 It 
follows from the resolution of 24 June 2015287 that the 
Russian delegation maintained its decision to suspend 
all official contacts with the Assembly until the end of 
2015.
Evaluation
A definite exclusion of a member of the Council of 
Europe is understood as a ‘self-cleansing’ exercise288. 
Such exclusion in extreme circumstances has the 
advantage that the Council of Europe maintains its 
credibility. However, exclusion from membership in 
the organisation has the undesirable effect that the 
Council of Europe loses the power to influence the 
course of a ‘recalcitrant’ Member State. Some authors 
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plead in favour of integrating a similar clause into the 
TEU289. 
Considering the more far-reaching objectives of the 
European Union, its understanding as a ‘Union of 
Law’ of supranational character and the far-reaching 
consequences for the citizens of the Member State 
concerned, the exclusion of a Member State from 
the European Union would be have more serious 
immediate effects for the Member State concerned 
and its citizens than its exclusion from the Council of 
Europe. Additionally it would amount to a capitulation 
to the actions of a ‘recalcitrant state’. 
In the system of the Council of Europe concerns the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) possibility 
to issue a ‘pilot-judgment’. It can do so in situations 
where the ECtHR receives a significant number of 
applications based on the same root cause290. It gives 
the ECtHR the possibility to choose one ‘model case’ 
and address concrete suggestions to the Member State 
on how to remedy the problem. Some authors would 
favour such a procedure also for the European Court of 
Justice291. As the law currently stands, the infringement 
procedure under Articles 258 to 260 TFEU does not 
provide for such a possibility. The ECJ can merely state 
that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation 
under the Treaties (see the wording of Article 260(1) 
TFEU). We shall see below in the Third Part, whether 
there are options which could enable the ECJ to take a 
more ‘constructive’ as opposed to merely ‘reactive’ part 
in the discussion of the protection of the Rule of Law 
in the European Union. 
2. Regional international 
organisations in the Americas and  
in Africa
2.1 Introduction
Regional organisations in the Americas are founded 
on three fundamental principles: Fundamental Rights, 
the Rule of Law and Democracy292. One of their main 
characteristics is that they fight exclusion293. In the last 
three decades, governments that normally jealously 
guard their sovereignty have agreed to such measures 
for the protection of democracy294. Some recent studies 
have explained the reason for this paradox. One is 
that democracy is conceived as a ‘global good’295 and 
the other that governments want to ensure that this 
development becomes more difficult to alter296. Those 
mechanism are intended to impede the overturning 
of democracy297. It is interesting to note that the 
likelihood that regional organisations will provide 
for such protection increases in line with its degree of 
complexity298. 
The large majority of regional international 
organisations in Africa, Latin-American and Asia are 
intergovernmental. A ‘recalcitrant’ government can 
therefore exercise its right to veto and block a decision 
which it considers unfavourable299. Such veto-rights 
coupled with unclear definitions and procedures 
in addition to a high level of discretion hamper the 
efficiency of any measures to protect democracy. This 
is valid in particular for the protection of human 
rights300. 
2.2 Overview of some Latin-
American regional international 
organisations
The existing mechanisms for ensuring homogeneity in 
Latin-American regional international organisations 
have recently been described in an exhaustive study 
(in Spanish) by Carlos Closa, Palestini and Ortiz 301 and 
a contribution by Carlos Closa to a collective work on 
the enforcement on EU law and values302. Therefore 
a short summary of their findings can suffice in this 
context.
Some of the instruments in question provide for 
sanctions such as the treaty on the Andean Community 
(Article 4) and UNASUR (Article 4). In the case of 
MERCOSUR, the Ushuaia Protocol itself does not 
include sanctions. Only the Montevideo Protocol 
(Ushuaia II) allows for the suspension of membership 
rights (Article 6), the power to request those sanctions 
lying with the ‘constitutional government’ (Articles 4 
and 5 Ushuaia II).
One feature is common to all the mechanisms 
discussed in this section: they all provide for a 
pivotal role played by the other Member States of the 
organisation in question303. In some organisations, such 
as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (CELAC)304 and the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM)305, only the affected Member State itself 
can trigger the monitoring mechanism306.
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2.3 Organization of American 
States (OAS)
In 1985, the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias integrated 
the obligation to protect and consolidate democracy in 
the OAS. In the 1990s, this process was strengthened 
by establishing the possibility of a meeting of the 
Permanent Council in the case of any threat to 
democracy within one of the OAS Member States. A 
sanction mechanism, introduced in 1992, entered into 
force in 1997, providing for the suspension of the rights 
of any Member whose democratic government had 
been put out of office in an unconstitutional manner. 
The last instrument to be employed in this context was 
the Democratic Inter-American Charter of 2001307.
It is interesting to note that a large number of regional 
organisations, as in the case of the European Union, 
did not have protection mechanisms included in 
their founding acts.  On the contrary, they were often 
added later by means of additional protocols or similar 
documents308. One of these protocols added to the 
MERCOSUR Treaty, Ushuaia II, of 20 December 2011309 
mentions democracy with the Rule of Law but is still to 
be ratified310. Another interesting difference between 
the Latin American Organisations and the European 
Union is that in contrast to the European Union,311 not 
all Latin-American regional organisations formally 
contain a clause excluding non-democratic states from 
membership312.
Many of the regional organisations treaties in Latin 
America contain a link between democracy and the 
Rule of Law313.  Often, however, the definitions are 
vague. The Inter-American Democratic Charter signed 
in Lima on September 11, 2001 contains a relatively 
precise definition of the concepts of democracy, Rule 
of Law and fundamental rights:
Article 2
The effective exercise of representative 
democracy is the basis for the Rule of Law and 
of the constitutional regimes of the member 
states of the Organization of American States. 
Representative democracy is strengthened 
and deepened by permanent, ethical, and 
responsible participation of the citizenry within 
a legal framework conforming to the respective 
constitutional order.
Article 3
Essential elements of representative democracy 
include, inter alia, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise 
of power in accordance with the rule of law, the 
holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based 
on secret balloting and universal suffrage as 
an expression of the sovereignty of the people, 
the pluralistic system of political parties and 
organizations, and the separation of powers and 
independence of the branches of government.314
It also provides for a sanctioning mechanism:
Article 20
In the event of an unconstitutional alteration 
of the constitutional regime that seriously 
impairs the democratic order in a member state, 
any member state or the Secretary General 
may request the immediate convocation of the 
Permanent Council to undertake a collective 
assessment of the situation and to take such 
decisions as it deems appropriate.
The Permanent Council, depending on the 
situation, may undertake the necessary 
diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to 
foster the restoration of democracy.
If such diplomatic initiatives prove unsuccessful, 
or if the urgency of the situation so warrants, the 
Permanent Council shall immediately convene 
a special session of the General Assembly. The 
General Assembly will adopt the decisions it 
deems appropriate, including the undertaking 
of diplomatic initiatives, in accordance with the 
Charter of the Organization, international law, 
and the provisions of this Democratic Charter.
The necessary diplomatic initiatives, including 
good offices, to foster the restoration of 
democracy, will continue during the process.
Article 21
When the special session of the General 
Assembly determines that there has been an 
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic 
order of a member state, and that diplomatic 
initiatives have failed, the special session shall 
take the decision to suspend said member state 
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from the exercise of its right to participate in the 
OAS by an affirmative vote of two thirds of the 
member states in accordance with the Charter 
of the OAS. The suspension shall take effect 
immediately.
The suspended member state shall continue 
to fulfil its obligations to the Organization, in 
particular its human rights obligations.
Notwithstanding the suspension of the member 
state, the Organization will maintain diplomatic 
initiatives to restore democracy in that state.315
Procedurally it is interesting to note that, contrary to 
the other systems described above, (a) the Secretary 
General can initialise the procedure and (b) that the 
quorum for a suspension vote (2/3) is far lower than 
in Article 7 TEU (unanimity for stating a serious 
and persistent breach and a qualified majority for the 
sanctions). Both provisions seem to facilitate the use 
of the mechanism. On the other hand, the suspension 
can only be used when diplomatic initiatives were 
not successful. It is, therefore, the ultima ratio. This 
instrument has been widely criticized for being 
inefficient and underused316. 
2.4 Conclusions
With regard to the typology of sanctions, the majority 
of organisations allow diplomatic sanctions and the 
suspension of membership rights, while some permit 
economic sanctions.317 One of the common elements 
in the triggering of such sanction mechanisms is 
that the Heads of Government enjoy a high level of 
discretion318. This is certainly one of the reasons for 
the scarcity if not complete absence of any practice 
in this regard. It might also explain why ‘democratic 
backsliding’ often meets a passive non-critical reaction 
which diminishes the quality and seriousness of the 
implementation of the fundamental values319. 
3. The Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU)
Homogeneity clause
In its constitutive act, the Organisation of African 
Unity (CAOAU) underlines the importance it attaches 
to democracy, the protection of human rights and the 
Rule of Law320. Even in its preamble, the Heads of State 
of the African countries express their determination 
“to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, 
consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and 
to ensure good governance and the Rule of Law (…)”. 
Article 4 mentions under point (m) “respect for 
democratic principles, human rights, the Rule of Law 
and good governance;” as some of the principles on 
which the OAU is based.
On 30 January 2007, the OAU reinforced its commitment 
to those principles by adopting the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG)321, 
whose objectives are defined in Article 2 ACDEG:
1. Promote adherence, by each State Party, to the 
universal values and principles of democracy and 
respect for human rights;
2. Promote and enhance adherence to the principle of 
the rule of law premised upon the respect for, and the 
supremacy of, the Constitution and constitutional 
order in the political arrangements of the State 
Parties.
State Parties are obliged to implement the ACDEG in 
accordance with the principles of respect for human 
rights, democracy and the Rule of Law (Article 3 
ACDEG).
Implementation
Under Article 23 of the CAOAU, the Assembly of the 
OAU shall determine sanctions in case of non-respect 
for the decisions and policies of the Organisation. The 
article does not contain a closed array of sanctions but 
rather mentions examples such as “denial of transport 
and communications links with other Member States, 
and other measures of a political and economic nature 
to be determined by the Assembly”.
Article 46 of the ACDEG empowers the Assembly and 
the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to 
determine “the appropriate measures in case of violation” 
of the ACDEG. Under Article 52 of the Protocol on 
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights (ACJHR), non-respect for judgments by the 
ACJHR can trigger such sanctions322. Following an 
application by one of the parties, the ACJHR may refer 
the non-compliant party to the Assembly which, in 
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turn, may decide on sanctions. This Protocol has not 
entered into force yet323.
Suspension of members is foreseen in case 
of governments coming to power ‘through 
unconstitutional means’ (Art. 30 CAOAU). The OAU 
has indeed suspended several members following 
coups d’états324. In cases where, under the umbrella 
of a semblance of formal legality, formerly legitimate 
governments have used doubtful means to prolong 
their stay in power, the OAU has, however, been 
largely inactive325. As with the Latin American systems, 
we observe here that the CAOAU does not seem to 
sanction legitimate governments when they engage in 
formally legitimate activities against the fundamental 
principles of the OAU.
Besides ‘hard’ implementation measures, such as 
suspension of members, the OAU also provides for 
‘soft’ compliance and monitoring procedures. In 2002, 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of 
the OAU adopted the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) obliging State Parties to 
promote and deepen democratic governance (Article 
36)326. For this purpose, the NEPAD establishes inter 
alia an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) based 
on voluntary accession. The APRM aims to enforce 
strict adherence to the position of the African Union 
(AU) on unconstitutional changes of government and 
on other decisions of African organization aimed at 
promoting democracy, good governance, peace and 
security327. Here we find an interesting mechanism 
defending the status quo, defending Member States’ 
sovereignty328 which contrasts the objectives of Article 
7 TEU.
Three of the APRM’s central objectives are identical 
to the values protected by Article 2 TEU: democracy, 
the Rule of Law and the protection of fundamental 
rights329. The APRM performs peer reviews based on 
mutually agreed codes and standards of democracy, as 
well as political, economic and corporate governance. 
Additionally, Article 49 ACDEG obliges the State 
Parties to present a report every two years on the 
legislative or other relevant measures taken in order to 
give effect to the principles and commitments of the 
Charter.
Experience
The practical experience with the suspension clause 
starts in the early 2000s. Since then the OAU has 
been very active. Its sanctions have influenced similar 
actions by regional African organisations330.
Evaluation
With regard to their substance, the principles and 
values defended by the OAU are largely identical to 
the ones of the TEU. With regard to the mechanisms 
for implementation, the reporting and peer review 
provided for could serve as a basis for discussion on 
alternative ‘soft’ mechanisms within the EU (see below 
Third Part). On the other hand, these mechanisms are 
largely triggered by the governments concerned and 
not by supranational independent institutions, which 
limits their scope compared to the one of Article 7 
TEU. This difference might also explain procedural 
flaws and predominantly political considerations 
in the deployment of sanctions observed by some 
commentators331. 
4.  Economic Community of Western 
African States (ECOWAS)
In 2001 the ECOWAS adopted a Protocol on Democracy 
and Good Governance332. The Protocol on Democracy 
and Good Governance appears to be an attempt at 
strengthening human security, political institutions 
and practices, human right norms, rule of law and 
socio-economic policies in the Member States. Article 
45 provides for sanctions. The most severe measures 
being the suspension of the Member State concerned 
from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies. They can 
be triggered either by an ‘abrupt end of democracy’ or 
massive violations of fundamental rights in a Member 
State. The relation between these provisions and the 
constitutional requirements of some of the Member 
States is considered problematic, given the lack of 
supra-national character of ECOWAS333.
5.  South African Development 
Community (SADC)
Some cases provide rather sad examples of non-
respect for the Rule of Law. One of these concerns the 
Tribunal of the SADC. In its preamble and its sections 
on principles (Article 4 SADC Charter), the SADC 
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expressly guarantees Human Rights and the Rule of 
Law334. Article 6 SADC Charter, similar to Article 
4(3) TEU, obliges Member States to take measures to 
promote achievement of those principles and to refrain 
from measures jeopardising them335. Article 33 SADC 
Charter empowers the Summit of the SADC to apply 
sanctions on Member States that persistently fail to 
fulfil obligations under the SADC or that implement 
policies which undermine its objectives.
Unfortunately these provisions proved to be dead 
letters when the SADC Tribunal rendered a judgment 
in a case concerning land reform in Zimbabwe336. The 
Tribunal has been defunct since337; due to the influence 
of the Mugabe regime it has been suspended338. The 
SADC did not intervene against the Mugabe regime, 
notwithstanding the obvious disrespect for the 
judgement of the Tribunal’s authority. We are therefore 
faced with an obvious failure to ensure the Rule of 
Law, at least according to the traditional European 
understanding339 in its most basic form. Some authors 
put this failure down to the historic character of the 
SADC as an association based on friendly cooperation 
and that, in the African context, litigation is at times 
understood as an alien way of resolving disputes, 
leading finally to a breakdown in relations340.  Others 
see in it a clash between the ex-colonial and the 
post-colonial powers dominating southern Africa341. 
A third opinion relates the failing of the Court to 
a precipitated emulation of an EU style judiciary 
which was at odds the SADC member states’ desire 
to ‘retain a more sovereignty-preserving institution342. 
Whatever the reasoning, the case of the SADC 
tribunal is a clear example that the mere existence of 
sanction mechanisms is not enough to ensure efficient 
protection of the Rule of Law.
C. Global International 
Organisations (sensu largo)
1. The United Nations
In the 2005 Outcome Document of the World Summit 
all Members States of the United Nations committed 
themselves “to actively protecting and promoting all 
human rights, the rule of law and democracy”343.
One of the characteristics of the UN system is that it 
allows for enforcement measures in case of threat to 
international peace and security (Chapter VII)344. 
Those measures are specific to the UN and, therefore, 
do not appear relevant for the research on the system 
established under the EU Treaties. 
More relevant provisions for the purposes of the 
present research are found in the first part of the UN 
Charter. According to Article 5 of the UN Charter345 a 
member against which preventive enforcement action 
has been taken might be suspended by the General 
Assembly following a recommendation from the 
Security Council. The idea behind this provision is to 
discipline a Member State which threatens or violates 
international peace and security or, more directly, 
committed an act of aggression346. Kelsen considered it 
a more valuable sanction than exclusion (see infra)347. 
Its role in practice has been limited due to the strict 
procedural requirements348.
As with Article 7 TEU the core elements are clear only 
the penumbral meaning is more doubtful349. Similar 
to the procedure foreseen in Article 7 TEU it requires 
unanimity in the Security Council. The General 
Assembly has to vote with a two-thirds majority350. The 
intention behind the high procedural threshold was to 
mirror the seriousness of the procedure but in practice 
the need to pass the Security Council twice has proven 
to render the application of the suspension clause 
close to impossible351. Up to 2003 no member state has 
ever been suspended on this basis352. Instead the UN 
has chosen a more pragmatic approach. It has refused 
the credentials of Members. They were effectively 
prevented from any participation in the activities of 
the General Assembly without having to apply the 
heavy procedure of Article 5 UN Charter353. 
Article 6 UN Charter provides, contrary to the provisions 
in the TEU, for the possibility of expelling a member 
of the UN.  The expulsion of a UN member requires 
a ‘persistent violation’ of the principles contained in 
the Charter. The General Assembly is competent for 
the expulsion and acts after recommendation of the 
Security Council. The possibility of expulsion needs 
to be put in the context of the typical UN system. 
According to this system, the Security Council can 
decide enforcement actions under Chapter VI of the 
Charter with a view to preserving international peace 
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and security. The latter has been found to be a more 
suitable tool for ensuring respect of the principles of 
the UN Charter354.
It is disputed whether the possibility of expulsion 
helps to achieve the goals of the UN Charter. On 
one hand expulsion might lead to a situation where 
a procedural deadlock can be overcome and it is a 
deterrent for potential ‘recalcitrant’ members. It has, 
on the other hand, a number of serious shortcomings: 
the ‘recalcitrant’ state can no longer be disciplined 
and expulsion runs counter to the objective of the UN 
to achieve universal membership355. Kelsen does not 
consider expulsion an adequate tool if it merely rids 
the member of its obligations356. It may be doubtful 
whether expulsion from an organization whose 
purpose is the maintenance of peace is an adequate 
sanction at all. This is certainly not the case, if by 
expulsion the member gets rid of the obligations which 
it has violated and thus has shown that it considers 
these obligations as an unwelcome burden. I share the 
evaluation of Tams, who argues that membership of 
the UN without any respect for its founding principles 
would, in the end, undermine the credibility of the 
UN itself and render it rather useless. Therefore the 
expulsion should be used only as a last resort357. 
For the purposes of the present research there is no 
need to go into the details of the discussions on the 
usefulness of Article of the 6 UN Charter. A mere glance 
at its wording shows that a) the terms used ‘persistently 
violated’ and ‘the principles of the UN Charter’ (without 
specifying which) and b) the procedural requirements 
(no veto by any of the Security Council members and 
two thirds majority in the General Assembly358 make 
expulsion of a member close to impossible, although 
there have been cases of persistent violation359. Instead, 
the UN used its powers under Chapter VII360. In 
general, expulsion clauses have not proven effective361.
Zimbabwe has been sanctioned under the 
Commonwealth362. This expulsion shows that such a 
sanction does not improve the situation in the Member 
State concerned. They rather lead to a complete lack 
of monitoring in the ‘recalcitrant’ State and can have 
disastrous consequences363.
In the end the expulsion clause is unlikely to be ever 
applied and leads to a lack of legal certainty since the 
practice concerning non-compliant Member States has 
followed a more pragmatic approach364.
2. The Commonwealth of Nations 
I shall conclude this chapter by briefly examining the 
practice of the Commonwealth of Nations with regards 
to the homogeneity of its members and its enforcement 
thereof (suspension or exclusion). The Commonwealth 
of Nations is not an international organisation in the 
traditional sense but rather a voluntary association of 
states bringing together 54 developing and developed 
nations from six continents365. The Commonwealth 
Charter underlines the sovereign character of the 
Commonwealth’s members, who are responsible 
for their own policies366. Its goal is to influence 
international society to the benefit of all through the 
pursuit of common principles and values by means of 
consultation and co-operation.
Despite fundamental differences with the EU, 
which is a much more closely knit organization, the 
Commonwealth’s practice can give some insights into 
the consequences of suspension of membership for 
violations of said ‘homogeneity clauses’.
Homogeneity clauses
The 1991 Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting (CHOGM) in Harare reaffirmed its member 
states’ commitment to protecting and promoting the 
“fundamental political values of the Commonwealth”: 
9. (…)
democracy, democratic processes and institutions 
which reflect national circumstances, the rule of 
law and the independence of the judiciary, just 
and honest government;
· fundamental human rights, including equal 
rights and opportunities for all citizens regardless 
of race, colour, creed or political belief;
· equality for women, so that they may exercise 
their full and equal rights;367
In the Charter of 2013 they went on to confirm this 
commitment, mentioning the Rule of Law as an essential 
element for the progress and prosperity of all368. The 
effective separation of powers between the Legislature, 
Executive and Judiciary guarantees the “rule of law, 
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the promotion and protection of fundamental human 
rights and adherence to good governance.”369. The Rule 
of Law is considered to be essential protection for the 
people and an assurance of limited and accountable 
government. Particular emphasis is also put on an 
independent and impartial judiciary370. In addition, 
the Rule of Law plays a crucial role for the promotion 
of good governance371.
The content of those values is largely identical to the 
ones on which the European Union is based, according 
to its Article 2 TEU. At the same time the Harare 
Declaration states explicitly that those are fundamental 
‘political’ values which raises the question as to their 
legal value. Taking into consideration the character of 
the Commonwealth of Nations as a loose association of 
states with no supranational character, this statement 
comes as no real surprise. At the same time, as we 
shall see in the following section, it is one of the few 
international mechanisms that has gained experience 
with enforcement mechanisms of homogeneity clauses. 
Enforcement mechanism
In 1995, Commonwealth Heads of Government 
adopted the Millbrook Commonwealth Action 
Programme on the Harare Declaration in order to 
“fulfil more effectively the commitments contained in 
the Harare Commonwealth Declaration”372.  In order 
to monitor respect for those values, the Millbrook 
Commonwealth Action Programme created inter alia 
a Ministerial Action Group to “deal with persistent 
or serious violations of the Commonwealth’s shared 
principles”373. It is interesting to note that its substantial 
requirements are also similar to the ones we find in 
Article 7 TEU, i.e. persistent or serious violations. 
The Group is composed of foreign ministers who assess 
infringements of the Commonwealth’s political values 
in its member states, and who recommend action to 
be taken as a result. Its task is to assess the nature of 
infringements and recommend measures for collective 
Commonwealth action with a view to restoring 
democracy and constitutional rule. For this purpose, 
the Group can suspend a country or even recommend 
its expulsion from the Commonwealth374. 
Practice of suspension or expulsion
Between 1995 and 2000, the Commonwealth has 
suspended Nigeria, Fiji and Pakistan from the 
benefits of full membership, either following military 
coups and/or serious breaches of the association’s 
fundamental principles375. Since its establishment, 
the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group 
(CHOGM) has suspended member states eight times. 
All suspended countries (except Zimbabwe, which 
opted to leave the Commonwealth in December 2003, 
following the CHOGM Statement on Zimbabwe) were 
returned to full membership following the restoration 
of democracy376. On 3 October 2013, the Government 
of Gambia withdrew from the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth itself places special emphasis on 
successful prevention and deterrence. It thus evaluates 
the work of the CHOGM very positively. Indeed, its 
authority to suspend member governments goes 
beyond the experience of other intergovernmental 
organizations377. 
Zimbabwe has been sanctioned under the 
Commonwealth378. This expulsion shows that such a 
sanction does not improve the situation in the Member 
State concerned. They rather lead to a complete lack 
of monitoring in the ‘recalcitrant’ State and can have 
disastrous consequences379.
Evaluation and lessons learned
Comparing the case of the Commonwealth of Nations 
with the Council of Europe, it is striking that Zimbabwe 
followed a similar approach to Greece in the 1980s 
when it decided to leave the Council of Europe rather 
than be excluded (see above in this Part). On the other 
hand, this experience shows that the existence of a 
sanctioning mechanism seems to work relatively well 
in the large majority of cases. Only when confronted 
with extreme ‘recalcitrant’ situations such as in Greece 
under the colonels and in Zimbabwe under President 
Mugabe, those international mechanisms reach their 
limits.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
In most of the regional international systems the 
concept of the Rule of Law is a substantial one. It 
is understood as being either a pre-condition for 
or a necessary element of true democracy and the 
protection of Human Rights. Regional international 
organisations play an important role in the definition 
and the protection of democracy and human rights380.
Our brief overview also confirms the findings of the 
Venice Commission that legal provisions on the Rule 
of Law at national and at international level are general 
in character and do not contain detailed definitions381. 
A common element among the clauses providing for 
the protection of fundamental values in both Latin 
American and European international organisations is 
a certain element of discretion in their application. A 
distinction, however, can be drawn between the objects 
of these clauses: whereas in the Latin American and in 
the African contexts, they are largely if not exclusively 
directed inwards, that is, towards a ‘non-constitutional’ 
government, in the Council of Europe and the European 
Union they can act against the government. On the 
basis of their historical experiences, the relevant Latin 
American and African mechanisms refer more to coup 
d’état-like situations. Even in cases where interventions 
happen, a structural bias in favour of the incumbent’s 
position in the conflict can be observed382.
To the contrary, the European mechanisms based on the 
specific European experience of the 20th century (see II 
above) focus rather on violations of the fundamental 
values by the formally ‘legitimate’ government itself, 
thus trying to safeguard government ‘for the people’ 
against a formally constitutional government.
With regard to the practical experience with the 
enforcement mechanisms this section has shown 
that practice is relatively scarce. Only in a relatively 
loosely knit cooperation mechanism such as the 
Commonwealth, the experience of suspension is 
more widespread. This can be explained by the nature 
of the association. The less serious the consequences 
for the Member State suffering suspension, the easier 
the application of the sanction. This finding can, in 
the end, be understood as an expression of a certain 
proportionality aspect of enforcement mechanisms 
against recalcitrant Members of an international 
organisation in the broad, non-technical sense. With 
regard to the conclusion to be drawn for the European 
Union it is, on the other hand, obvious that the high 
degree of integration pleads in favour of a rather 
prudent approach. 
Based on the experience in federal systems, we can 
reasonably rebut the ‘unjustified negative feedback 
loop’383 pertaining to the alleged lack of activity by 
the European Union in relation to threats to the 
Rule of Law in Member States. Such unmotivated 
and disproportionate blame of the European Union’s 
institutions merely adds unnecessarily to what one 
author rightly called an “unfair and inaccurate narrative 
of institutional paralysis, policy failure and cynical 
realpolitik”384. In the end, it only favours ‘Westphalian’ 
sovereignty discourses by putting coal on the fire of 
populist Euroscepticism instead of allowing for an 
open and rational discourse about the protection of 
fundamental values which takes into consideration the 
legal, historical, institutional and political framework 
the European Union has to respect.
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I. THE RULE OF LAW UNDER 
ARTICLE 2 TEU
A. Core Elements of the Rule 
of Law in Article 2 TEU
Definitions concerning the rule of law have occupied 
legal science for a long time385. Two basic philosophies 
exist: one a thin, merely formal definition of the 
Rule of Law386, and one more substantial, including 
elements such as human rights. As we have seen in 
the introduction to the First Part of this article, the 
understanding of the Rule of Law in the European 
Union is inspired by the constitutional traditions of 
the Member States and by international treaties, first 
and foremost by the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 387. In the Second 
Part we have shown that both apply a ‘thick concept’ of 
the Rule of Law.
In the European context a ‘thin’ definition limited 
to mere formal legality cannot prevail since it would 
negate the experiences of history in particular with 
the Weimar Constitution388 and would not respect 
the substantial concept of the Rule of Law followed in 
other European constitutions389. We have also seen (see 
supra Second Part III.) that international organisations 
on the regional and on the global level apply a ‘thick’ 
definition of the Rule of Law, including elements such 
as democratic participation and an effective system of 
checks and balances.
The modern Rule of Law can only serve its purpose as 
a fundamental value when it is understood as a tool 
for the protection of the other fundamental values 
and democracy. These three concepts are inseparably 
linked390. Merely defending formal lawfulness does not 
do the job391. The Rule of Law is necessary to complete 
the triadic notion of government of, by and for the 
people and it explains the essence of a comprehensive 
understanding of democracy as the absence of a 
dictatorship of the majority392.
In its Communication of 11 March 2014 the 
Commission mentioned the main elements of the 
fundamental values protected in Article 2 TEU393. They 
reflect the finding made above that the Euroepan Union 
is based on a ‘thick concept’ of the Rule of Law394.
Although disputed in some respects395, even critical 
authors agreed that the Commission listed the core 
elements of the Rule of Law396:
• Legality (checks and balances), as essential 
elements for the protection of democracy and 
Human Rights
• Legal certainty
• Respect for human rights (in particular equality & 
non-discrimination)
• Protection against arbitrariness of executive power 
(good administration)
• Judicial control: independent (externally and 
internally) courts decide in case of conflict
• Application of procedural guarantees  (equality of 
arms; right to be heard)
This list is largely identical to the draft of a Rule of Law 
Checklist the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission 
on the necessary elements of the Rule of Law397. The 
final ‘checklist’ adopted in March 2016 is based on the 
same principles. At the same time, it is more detailed 
and enriched by concrete benchmarks398 which can 
provide useful guidance for the Commission in the 
fulfilment of its tasks under Article 7 TEU. There is no 
need to define all possible ramifications of the rule of 
law since Article 7 TEU only covers ‘serious breaches’.
Some authors criticize the list in the Commission’s 
Communication for not including ‘accessibility’ of 
the law, the protection of legitimate expectations, 
or the principle of proportionality399. This criticism 
seems to be largely unwarranted. All three aspects 
are actually covered by the core elements listed by 
the Commission. Legal certainty comprises inter 
alia ‘clarity of the law’, which seems to include both 
the aspects of accessibility and of the need to respect 
legitimate expectations. In addition, under the heading 
‘prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers’, the 
Communication refers expressly to the protection 
against disproportionate intervention400. The ECJ 
refers to legal certainty and to legitimate expectations 
as general principles of European Union law which 
Member States are required to respect when adopting 
measures implementing European Union law401.
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II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
RULE OF LAW IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION BY MEANS 
OF ARTICLE 7 TEU
A. Interpretation of the 
notions ‘serious and 
persistent’ breach
Article 7 TEU  allows for sanctions only in case of a 
clear risk (para. 1) or the actual existence (para. 2) of 
a serious breach. As we have seen in the Second Part, 
the qualification of the breach as ‘serious’ was inspired 
by texts of national systems and other international 
agreements402, a statement which shows that the 
interpretation problems Article 7 TEU creates are not 
unique but does not provide any immediate help for 
solving them. At the same time, it puts the criticism 
voiced against the uncertainty of the terms used in 
Article 7 TEU into perspective. Whilst, on one hand, it is 
true to point out their lack of precision; such vagueness 
is, on the other, unavoidable and very common when 
truly exceptional situations must be covered by a norm. 
An analysis of the existing jurisprudence in other fields 
can help with the interpretation of those concepts. It 
also replies to a request by the European Parliament to 
establish objective criteria for the implementation of 
Article 7 TEU403.
When facing the task of interpreting vague terms in 
legislation, it is always useful to compare with the case-
law in other fields.
The concept of a ‘serious breach’ is also found in the 
ECJ’s jurisprudence with regard to non-contractual 
liability404. The case-law requires that for engaging the 
EU’s non-contractual liability a sufficiently serious 
breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on 
individuals has to established. Whether the institution 
concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the 
limits of its discretion is the decisive test for the 
seriousness405.  ”It is solely where that institution 
or organ has only considerably reduced, or even no, 
discretion, that the mere infringement of Community 
law may suffice to establish the existence of a sufficiently 
serious breach”406. In situations where an institution 
enjoys a large margin of discretion, any sufficiently 
serious breach of the rules of law at issue must be based 
on a manifest and serious disregard of the limits on the 
broad discretion enjoyed when exercising its powers407.
In agreement with this case-law, the seriousness of a 
violation can be defined with regard to its object, its 
result, its intensity and the behaviour of the ‘violator’408. 
It is striking that this suggestion is very similar to the 
one brought forward by some Spanish authors in order 
to define the concept of serious violation of the State’s 
interest in Art. 155 SC409. It does not come as a surprise 
that if applied by analogy to Article 7 TEU situations, 
in general the margin of discretion enjoyed by Member 
States is very large, therefore the ambit of Article 7 
TEU very limited.
The European Court of Justice had the opportunity 
to develop some case-law with regard to the notion 
of a ‘persistent breach’. The cases concerned situations 
in which the Commission attacked a Member State’s 
administrative practice under Article 258 TEU. 
The leading case with regard to ‘systemic or persistent 
breach’ under Article 258 TFEU is case C-494/01 
Commission v. Ireland410. It was based on a series of 
complaints received by the Commission over a period 
of 3 years between 1997 and 2000 from Irish citizens 
on a number of incidents involving the deposit of 
waste allegedly in violation of the provisions of the 
waste directive. The Commission not only asked the 
Court to establish that Ireland had failed to comply 
with its obligations under the waste directive in each of 
these individual cases, it also maintained that the cases 
provided the basis for a declaration by the Court that 
there has been a general and structural infringement 
of the waste directive by Ireland. The Commission’s 
action was aimed primarily at establishing that Ireland 
has failed to comply with its obligations under the 
waste directives in a general and structural manner411. 
It referred to a number of other cases that were not the 
subject of the twelve complaints, but were in the public 
domain as further illustrations of non-compliance. The 
Commission attacked these incidents as a part of an 
underlying pattern.
The Court accepted in its judgment that an 
administrative practice can be the subject-matter of an 
action for failure to fulfil obligations when it is, to some 
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degree, of a consistent and general nature412. 
The opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in this case 
is particularly instructive. He refers to a dimension 
of scale, a dimension of time and a dimension of 
seriousness. He understands scale as referring to the 
number of instances of infringements. The dimension 
of time obviously relates to the fact that the situation 
of non-compliance has existed for some time. The 
dimension of seriousness refers to the degree to which 
the actual situation in the Member State deviates from 
the result intended to be achieved by the Community 
obligation413.
In other cases the Court has confirmed this case-
law. It referred to a situation where a Member State 
has repeatedly over a long period of time failed to 
meet its obligations under EU law and found that 
administrative practices fall within the scope of 
infringement procedures if the Commission can 
establish that the breaches are structural and general414. 
The Commission must document the practice and 
provide detailed proof that there is some degree of a 
consistent and general nature and that the cases are not 
isolated415. 
Conclusion of A.
The three criteria developed by the European Court 
of Justice to determine whether a Member State’s 
administrative practice violates its obligations under 
Union law, i.e. the general and structural character of 
an infringement; the scale; the time or duration; and the 
seriousness, could be applied for determining whether 
the conditions in Article 7(2) TEU are fulfilled.
B. Main characteristics of 
the EU
The powers (and in particular their limits) of the 
European Union under Article 7 TEU have to be 
understood against the background of the main 
characteristics of the European Union as compared 
to a state, on the one hand, and to an international 
organisation, on the other.
The European Union is a ‘Union of States and citizens’ 
(Articles 1 and 4(2) TEU) and not ‘a state’. It is understood 
that the wording of Article 4(2) TEU excludes the 
creation of a European Federal State416. Therefore, 
the Rule of Law in the EU context needs to take into 
consideration the ‘tripartite relations’417 between the 
European Union, in particular its institutions, the 
Member States and individuals. Also the fact that the 
EU is not a state has important repercussions for the 
competences of the European Union in the field of 
protecting the Rule of Law. Most of the mechanisms 
described by Loewenstein in ‘Militant Democracy’418 
cannot be applied by the European Union since it 
involves ‘vertical’ measures which are typical for a ‘state’. 
They are employed by public authorities and directed 
at citizens or associations such as political parties. The 
European Union does not have those ‘policing’ powers; 
on the contrary, Article 4(2) TEU expressly obliges the 
European Union to respect the essential functions of 
the State such as the maintenance of law and order. 
Consequently, ‘horizontal’ mechanisms (between 
public authorities) are more relevant to the purpose of 
the present research.
Contrary to international organisations Union law 
enjoys through its own authority primacy over the law 
of the Member States. Declaration 17 annexed to the 
final act of the intergovernmental conference which 
adopted the Treaty of Lisbon recalls the settled case-
law of the European Court of Justice since 1964.
The context of European Union law as a whole 
underlines the importance of fundamental values. 
According to Article 3 TEU, the promotion of its 
values and the well-being of its peoples is one of 
the European Union’s goals (para. 1) which it shall 
pursue by appropriate means commensurate with the 
competences which are conferred upon it in the Treaties 
(para. 6). In all its activities, the European Union is 
bound by the principles of conferral, subsidiarity and 
proportionality.
But what about the Member States’ role in this context? 
The Treaties do not only limit the powers of the European 
Union as just described but, as a counterweight, also 
impose important obligations on the Member States. 
First and foremost through the primacy of Union law 
which Member States recognised, (see above) and are 
obliged to respect.
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More concretely, according to the principle of sincere 
cooperation, Member States are obliged to assist the 
European Union in carrying out those tasks which flow 
from the Treaties (TEU and TFEU) (Article 4(3) TEU) 
(for more details see below in this Part). Furthermore, 
the Member States have to (positively) facilitate the 
achievement of the Union’s tasks and (negatively) 
refrain from any measure which could jeopardize the 
attainment of the Union’s objectives. Additionally, 
according to Article 19 (1) TEU, Member States must 
provide efficient legal protection in the fields covered 
by Union law. Fundamental values and their protection 
are undisputably covered by Union law at least since 
Article 7 TEU has been incorporated into the Treaty. 
Given the high rank the Rule of Law enjoys among the 
Union’s objectives these findings can have an important 
influence on the interpretation of the Member States’ 
obligations.
C. Why should the European 
Union protect the Rule of 
Law and other fundamental 
values in the Member States?
First, an obvious reply: because the Treaties say so. 
This answer is not as trivial and legalistic as it seems. 
The Treaties were ratified by all the parliaments of all 
the Member States, which gives them a high degree 
of democratic legitimacy419. It proves that, at least in 
theory, national authorities accept that transnational 
bodies, here the European Union’s institutions, are 
better placed to ascertain and interpret transnational 
standards420. At the same time it would be extremely 
useful in this context if national authorities themselves 
(such as governments, parliaments and courts) could 
break their shell as defenders of strictly national 
interests. They should understand that they have 
become to a certain extent European Isntitutions and, 
thus, should also defend European interests421. From a 
theoretical point of view I. Kant underlined long ago 
that a State only enjoys the authority to request its 
citizens to abide by the internal rules if it respects its 
legal obligations vis-á-vis other states422. Historically it 
also makes perfect sense since experience has shown 
that having a multiplicity of jurisdictions helps to 
manage risk and can increase resistance to bad rule423. 
In the 20th century federalism often came under threat 
when government systems moved from democracy to 
more authoritarian regimes424. 
We have seen above that the European Union is a 
Union of Member States and its citizens. European 
integration is seen historically as one of the principal 
means with which to consolidate democracy425.
Nowadays defending democracy has long become both 
a European and global task426. The blind ‘Schmitt-ian’ 
faith in the state as the sole protector against threats 
to the individual and his strict juxtaposition of Own 
and Foreign, Friend and Foe427 do not reflect modern 
transnational reality. As P. Häberle put it: “With Carl 
Schmitt neither Switzerland can be explained nor Europe 
can be built”428. Nevertheless Carl Schmitt’s theories are 
still influential in political and legal circles in Germany 
and beyond429.
On a more macro-oriented perspective such an 
approach neglects the occurrence of cooperation as a 
gradual replacement for aggressive competition and a 
rapidly increasing force shaping human evolution430. 
Instead of being forward-oriented, it negates the 
developments brought about in theory by I. Kant in 
the late 18th century and in practice by the movement 
towards effective international cooperation since the 
end of the Second World War. Instead it brings society 
back to its atavistic destructive origins of aggressive 
competition which has dominated the human species 
for millions of years431 culminating in two World Wars 
in the last century. 
There is also a much more practical side of the 
importance to find transnational solutions. Decisions 
taken in a Member State which does not respect the Rule 
of Law affect European Union’s citizens on two levels 
(‘all affected principle’)432. Indirectly, since all Member 
States participate in decisions in the Council and the 
European Parliament. Hence, illiberal tendencies can 
influence the outcome of European Union legislation 
which is applicable in all Member States433. More 
directly, since citizens of all Member States can be 
affected by internal decisions taken by a Member 
State, when making use of their freedoms under the 
EU Treaties, for example when living or doing business 
in a different Member State. Therefore, providing for a 
certain degree of homogeneity in the European Union 
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also ensures a level of ‘indirect democracy’. Otherwise 
EU citizens would be affected by decisions in Member 
States which are entirely beyond their influence434. If a 
norm or a decision has effects beyond the level on which 
it is made the national democratic legitimacy cannot 
heal the flaw in the norm/decision435. Such as decisions 
can, for example, concern issues of a major scale such 
as the independence of parts of the territory436  or, on a 
minor scale, issues such as the need for non-nationals 
to pay a guarantee in case of civil litigation437. 
Ensuring respect for the Rule of Law in the European 
Union amounts to  an expression of the European 
Union’s obligation to protect the general interest and its 
rational legitimacy in the Weberian sense438. Therefore 
these substantial values give, at the end of day, a meaning 
to the organisation of the polity439. The European 
Union was not created as an end in itself but rather 
to further the objectives agreed to under the founding 
act440, be it the Constitution in national systems, or 
the TEU and TFEU in the system of the European 
Union. Thus, the transnational authorities can actually 
enhance the democratic legitimacy of states441 and 
create synergies between national and supranational 
legitimacy442. In this context it is important to underline 
that the European Union enjoys a triple legitimacy: a 
democratic legitimacy through the direct elections to 
the European Parliament, an integration legitimacy 
by means of the independent Commission and one 
derived from the Member States via the Council and 
the European Council443. Its ‘transnational legitimacy’ 
can help establish one of the most important aspects 
of the human condition: the relationship to the alien 
is what Professor Weiler famously called one of the 
normatively most important aspects of the human 
condition and to our multicultural societies: a decent 
relationship to the alien444.
The European Court of Justice has repeatedly decided 
that the European Union is a “Community based on the 
mutual trust that the common values will be recognised 
in the EU”445.  As Müller puts it in a very catchy manner: 
“It is exactly because Brussels can mistrust Member 
States, Member States can then trust each other”446. The 
only qualification I would add is that the ‘mistrust’ is 
an exception to the rule. Its exceptional character can 
be easily explained by the fundamental importance of 
the trust between Institutions and Member States and 
the subsidiarity principle (see supra in this Part).
Other important aspects pleading in favour of a 
protection of the Rule of Law are to maintain the 
European Union’s credibility inside and outside its 
territory447 and to provide transnational solutions 
for transnational issues448. Faced with the growing 
interdependency between Member States national 
governments, notwithstanding their ‘national’ 
democratic legitimacy, Member States are not able 
include everyone affected by their decisions. Therefore 
Member States actually suffer a democratic deficit449.
On a more critical note, other authors refer to the lack 
of truly democratic policy choices offered to the voter 
with regard to the European Union and the ensuing 
risk of objectifying the citizen450. On a more general 
level, with regard to post-national citizenship and 
answering to Habermas and Rawls, the question is 
asked whether the role of the citizen as a political actor 
is duly taken into consideration451. If this is not the 
case, it is argued that the citizen will lack attachment to 
the political community and the desire to participate in 
the activities of citizenship452.
This criticism is understandable but not entirely 
convincing. It fails to take into account the special 
character of the European Union and does not 
take into consideration the down-sides of a ‘non-
transnational’ political community. Whilst it is 
undoubtedly true that the institutions of the European 
Union lack the democratic legitimacy commonly 
associated with national polities, the European Union 
can be understood as reflecting a pluralist model of 
democracy. Democratic legitimacy is granted by the 
national representatives in the Council and by the 
directly elected European Parliament453. Furthermore, 
we have just seen that national democratic legitimacy 
easily reaches its limits when faced with transnational 
issues for the simple reason that the national decisions 
do not take into consideration their effects on citizens 
who cannot participate e.g. in the national elections 
or in referenda. Therefore they exclude and might 
alienate the European Union nationals living on the 
national territory, using their right to free movement. 
It is common knowledge that, at the same time, 
‘traditional’ merely procedural democratic decisions 
have led to evil regimes objectifying citizens to the 
point of annihilating parts of the population. This 
proves the limits of traditional, national policy choice 
democratic legitimacy. Since democracy is not a goal 
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in itself454, but like the Rule of Law, should further 
the common good and protect the individual against 
arbitrary government455, new solutions must be found 
in order to reply to those demands.
How can this ‘disenchantment’ of the people with the 
political process be avoided? How can we ensure that 
a political decision in one Member State takes into 
account the potential negative effects on citizens living 
in other Member States and on foreigners living in the 
Member State where the decision is taken?  A reply to 
the latter question is urgently needed in a transnational 
context. If national systems fail to address these issues 
they fail an important test for a truly democratic 
system. 
It is interesting to note that transnational participation 
is well known in other fields, in particular the 
environment as an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA). The EIA aims at furthering the accountability of 
and transparency in decision-making and to strengthen 
public support for decisions on the environment, and, 
thus contribute to strengthening democracy456.
With regard to projects/programmes having 
transboundary environmental effects, the ESPOO 
Convention provides for a notification and 
consultation process and the obligation to take the 
results of the process into account when the decision 
is made457. The International Court of Justice has 
recognised the obligation of a ‘transboundary EIA’ as a 
general principle of customary international law (para. 
205)458. Similar wording is to be found in Principle  17 
of  the  Rio  Declaration459 and Article 7 of the  ILC’s 
Articles  on  Prevention  of  Transboundary  Harm and 
Article  206  of  the  1982  UN  Convention  on  the 
Law  of  the  Sea460. Although the details are not firmly 
defined, at least the following elements are undisputed: 
notification, information, consultation of the public 
and a general duty of cooperation461.
The idea behind these procedural requirements is that 
a state first needs to have sufficient information and 
understand the environmental impact of an activity 
before it can take a reasonable decision462. It is plain 
to see that such an approach could also increase the 
democratic legitimacy of political decisions with 
transnational effects (in the sense of transboundary 
and fundamentally affecting also nationals of other 
Member States living on its territory). A recent study 
on the European’s perception of democracy has 
revealed that a large majority considers that ‘their’ 
national government does not take the views of other 
governments sufficiently into account in its decision-
making463. 
Whether the findings on transboundary EIA can 
partially be applied by analogy to transnational 
effects of political decisions is obviously an extremely 
delicate question and would exceed the purpose of the 
present article. Theoretically, possible justifications 
for such an approach could be found in Article 4(3) 
third indent TEU, which obliges the Member States 
to facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks. One 
of those tasks is mentioned in Article 3(1) TEU, inter 
alia to promote its values, amongst which democracy 
figures prominently. According to Rodrik, the absence 
of transnational democracy at the EU-level creates 
vicious circles which inter alia lead to the absence of 
durable EU-wide institutional arrangements464
Further research on this question would also have 
to take into consideration the particular character of 
the European Union; the need to respect the national 
identities (Article 4(2) TEU) and the principle of 
subsidiarity (Article 5 TEU). One important aspect for 
evaluating subsidiarity is that experience has shown 
that Member States cannot achieve the objective of 
ensuring ‘transnational democracy’; which, at first 
glance could speak in favour of an action at Union 
level. Some of the political advantages of such a 
European Political Impact Assessment (EPIA) would 
be the following: citizens could participate in decision 
affecting them; the need to exchange information 
between Members States could lead to a rationalisation 
of the political discourse since merely populist 
arguments might not be as successful in one Member 
State as in its neighbouring countries which are equally 
affected by the decision. 
Independently from such possible participation 
rights de lege ferenda one important question can be 
examined already de lege lata: What is the role of the 
individual in this context referring to the protection 
of the ‘transnational good’? For the citizens, the Rule 
of Law should act as a shield against arbitrary power 
exercised by the Union and by the Member States465. In 
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order to illustrate this concept, I’d like to use the roles 
of complainants in the infringement procedure under 
Article 258 TFEU and in the preliminary reference 
procedure under Article 267 TFEU as an example. 
Quantitatively, the latter has become the most 
important procedure in recent years466. The frequency 
with which preliminary questions are asked show the 
national courts’ and the litigants confidence in the 
ECJ467. From a qualitative point of view, the preliminary 
ruling procedure is a keystone of the European Union’s 
judicial system468. It is essential in ensuring the uniform 
application of European Union law469. The former 
President of the ECJ Mr Skouris called it the main 
instrument for the development and implementation 
of Union law470. Besides these important substantial 
functions it closes, from a procedural view, the gap 
of legal remedies for the individual by establishing 
the possibility of indirectly challenging the validity 
of a European Union norm471. In this respect it is an 
essential part of the system of efficient legal protection 
under European Union law472. Therefore it fulfils its 
task to render the ECJ closer to the citizen and, hence, 
a bit ‘more constitutional’, which appears to have been 
the intention of the founding fathers in order to reply 
to demands by Germany473. The same goes for the role 
of the complainants in the infringement procedure. 
Complaints have led to important procedures against 
Member States in the interest of upholding the 
supremacy of Union law, against a Member State who 
was not always willing or able to respect its obligation.
But what is the citizen’s role in the context of protecting 
the fundamental values of the European Union? Is it 
true that, as Professor Weiler states, the preliminary 
reference procedure posits an individual against the 
national public good474? From a strictly procedural 
point of view that statement is correct, but this is, in my 
view, not necessarily the end of the story. The national 
public good should also comprise respect for European 
law and its supremacy. Because that is what Member 
States agreed to when they joined the European Union. 
Therefore the preliminary reference procedure plays 
a pivotal role in ensuring the effective and uniform 
application of Union law. On a more formal point 
and replying to the criticism of the individual being 
a mere ‘object’ of Union law as mentioned earlier, the 
preliminary reference procedure puts the national 
courts and the individual in a very active role. In these 
cases the individual, and the national court asking 
the preliminary question, become the actors on the 
European legal scene. They turn into active agents 
and leave their role as mere objects of European law. 
This is exactly the genius of the preliminary reference 
procedure475.  If the individual manages to convince 
the European Court of Justice of his or her point of 
view it is the general European interest as expressed in 
the law of the European Union which prevails over the 
narrower national interest as expressed in the national 
legislation in question.  It is, therefore, not necessarily 
the ‘self-centered’ individual that is in the center of the 
preliminary reference procedure. It is rather, to use, 
mutatis mutandis, the words of St. Thomas, rendering 
a famous passage of the Ethics an expression of the 
leitmotiv of the European Union: “bonum commune 
Europae est melius et divinius quam bonum unius”476. 
There is one more important aspect inherent in the 
procedure under Article 267 TFEU: the parties of the 
national legal procedure are not necessarily nationals 
of the country where the national litigation takes 
place477. Hence, the preliminary reference procedure 
helps also to  partially re-establish the legitimacy of the 
national legislation at stake. It gives a procedural tool 
to EU-residents who were turned into mere objects 
of national legislation without having enjoyed any 
participation rights in the legislative process.
D. Which role for the 
different institutions of 
the European Union?
1. Introduction
The distribution of competences under the Treaties 
provides important elements for the reply to the 
question which role the different institutions of the 
European Union play in ensuring respect for the Rule 
of Law. The importance of institutions was famously 
underlined by Jean Monnet; “Nothing is possible 
without men; nothing is lasting without institutions.” 
For this purpose we shall examine separately the core 
powers attributed to the European Union’s institutions 
by the Treaties. The principle of separation of power 
in the European Union has been intensely studied478. 
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For the purpose of this research it appears sufficient to 
outline the basic structure with a close view to the text 
of the Treaties and the practice of the institutions. All 
institutions have important, complementary roles to play 
in the protection of fundamental values, in particular 
the Rule of Law479. In order to be complementary, they 
cannot be identical as this would imply a duplication 
of efforts and would blur the separation of powers 
under Union law. The EU institutions must respect 
the distribution of competences and the institutional 
balance foreseen by the Treaties. 
2. The role of the European 
Parliament in the protection of the 
ROL
The tasks of the European Parliament are enumerated in 
Article 14 TEU. Its primary role is to exercise legislative 
and budgetary functions. It shall exercise functions 
of political control and consultation as laid down in 
the Treaties. With regard to the discussions of issues 
of Fundamental Values in Hungary and Poland the 
European Parliament was very active in monitoring the 
Member States (Hungary480, Poland481) and politically 
controlling the activities of the Commission. It has 
an important role to play in holding the Commission 
accountable for its actions or for its inactivity.
At the same time it should not be forgotten that the 
European Parliament itself can initiate the procedure 
under Article 7(1) TEU. Neither with regard to 
Hungary nor Poland has it has found the necessary 
one-third majority482.  Another aspect speaking against 
a more active role for the European Parliament is that 
the Article 7 TEU procedure should not be over-
politicised. The European Parliament is an eminently 
political institution; therefore its classical role is to be 
seen more in monitoring the Commission to avoid risk 
of political or at least perceived political bargaining 
(Austria case).
Currently the European Parliament is working on a 
mechanism to improve the use of Article 7 TEU.  On 
5 April 2016 the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs suggested the conclusion of an inter-
institutional agreement (“EU Pact for Democracy, the 
Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights (DRF) in the form 
of an inter-institutional agreement”) on a more effective 
use of the Article 7 TEU mechanism483.
Such an inter-institutional agreement would need 
the approval of the Council. Experience with the Pre-
Article 7 TEU Procedure and the ‘Rule of Law dialogue’ 
shows the Member States’ reluctance to enter into any 
form of binding undertaking with regard to the respect 
for the Rule of Law. Probabilities that they would 
enter into an inter-institutional agreement providing 
for concrete obligations in this regard appear fairly 
limited. On a more general level it is doubtful whether 
embarking in a long discussion on new instruments 
would be a better way of ensuring respect for the Rule 
of Law than improving the current tools484. 
3. The European Council 
The European Council is composed of the Heads of 
State or Government of the Member States together 
with the President of the European Parliament and the 
President of the Commission (Art. 15(2)TEU). It shall 
give the European Union the necessary impetus for its 
development and shall define priorities and general 
political directions (Art. 15(1) TEU). 
Already its composition shows that it is an eminently 
political institution. It largely works with a consensus 
mechanism485 which will make it difficult to adopt 
measures against one of its members. 
4. The Member States of the EU  
Although the Member States are not an ‘institution’ in 
the technical sense they play an important role in the 
achievement of the European Union’s objectives. We 
have already seen (above in this Part) that according to 
Article 4(3) 2nd and 3rd section TEU they are obliged 
to take any appropriate measure to ensure fulfilment 
of the obligations arising out of the Treaties (TEU and 
TFEU) and to facilitate the achievement of the Union’s 
tasks. Inversely, they have to refrain from any measure 
which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives.
With regard to the control of the application of 
Member States have – at least in theory – far-reaching 
competences.  They can bring a non-compliant Member 
State to the European Court of Justice for violation of 
an obligation under the Treaties (Article 259 TFEU). 
Empirically speaking, this option has hardly ever been 
used. According to the leading German Commentary 
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on the EU Treaties, until 2015 only six cases were 
brought under Article 259 TFEU of which two were 
withdrawn before a judgement was rendered486. 
Practically this option is rather ‘a sleeping beauty’ 
which is used in rather exceptional and sometimes 
politically important cases487. Some authors explain 
the lack of Member States’ initiative in this regard as an 
expression of ‘diplomatic considerateness’488. Others, 
on a more positive note, interpret its infrequent use 
by as an expression of Member States’ trust in the 
Commission’s effectiveness as Guardian of the Treaties 
(TEU and TFEU)489. 
Under Article 7 TEU they enjoy the right of initiative 
but have not found the one third quorum for initiating 
a procedure. As one author put it, asking the Member 
State to initiate such a procedure amounts to asking 
turkeys voting for Thanksgiving (4/5 or unanimous)490; 
other describe it as scandalous how Member States 
turn a blind eye to the violations of fundamental values 
by their peers491.
5. The Council
According to Article 16 TEU the core task of the 
Council is to exercise legislative, budgetary, policy-
making and coordinating functions. Some authors 
refer to the Council as a Janus-like institution492 since, 
on one hand, it is an EU institution whereas, on the 
other, it is composed of Member States’ representatives.
The Council has continuously underlined the 
importance of the Rule of Law. When it comes to 
concrete steps to ensure respect for the Rule of Law in 
Member States it is much more hesitant though. It aims 
to encourage the culture of “respect for rule of law” 
through a “constructive dialogue among all Member 
States”.
Empirically, the Council’s suggestion of an annual 
Rule of Law dialogue493 is not very useful for attacking 
concrete Rule of Law issues. The first ‘Rule of Law 
dialogue’ organised by the Council Presidency in 
November 2015 did not mention any of the concrete 
issues on the Rule of Law, such as the situation in 
Hungary, but rather generally dealt with the Rule of 
Law in the digital age494.
Consequently, the annual dialogue as an ‘instrument’ 
to protect the Rule of Law in the Member States led 
to strong criticism by academic authors. To name just 
a few: it was considered as a ‘façade for action’495; has 
the lowest possible formal value, does not refer to any 
concrete obligations of the Member States and reverts 
to a purely intergovernmental procedure496.
Whilst undoubtedly justified with regard to the first 
`annual dialogue`, the situation changed in 2016. The 
second Rule of Law dialogue which was held under the 
Dutch presidency in the first half of 2016, provided 
for more concrete discussions497. The debates focussed 
on the challenges to the Rule of Law and the other 
fundamental values created by the high number of 
refugees coming to the EU.
6. The Commission
In the current section we shall only present the 
Commission’s general role under the Treaties. Its 
current practice is dealt with below in Section III.
According to Article 17 TEU the Commission has the 
tasks of promoting the general interest of the Union and 
of taking appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall also 
ensure the application of the Treaties (TEU and TFEU) 
(…) and oversee the application of Union law under 
the control of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. It allows for a large range of activities such as 
collection, assessment and publication of information 
concerning compliance with Union law498. 
The General Court has recently confirmed the 
importance of the Commission’s independence. 
“81      (…)  it is also for the Commission, which, 
in accordance with Article  17(1) TEU, is to 
promote the general interest of the European 
Union and take appropriate initiatives to that 
end (…) (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 April 
2015 in Council v Commission, C-409/13, ECR, 
EU:C:2015:217, paragraph 70).
82      Thus, the Commission, which is to promote 
the general interest and to be completely 
independent in carrying out its responsibilities, 
has been made responsible for discerning the 
general interest of all the Member States and 
proposing solutions capable of furthering that 
general interest (see, to that effect, Opinion 
of Advocate General Jääskinen in Council v 
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Commission, C-409/13, ECR, EU:C:2014:2470, 
paragraph 43).
83    Consequently, when the Commission 
prepares and develops policy proposals, it must 
ensure that it acts in a fully independent manner 
and that its proposals are made exclusively in 
the general interest.
84      Correspondingly, that institution must be 
placed in a position to act, at that stage, in a 
fully independent manner and in the service of 
the general interest.”499
The other institutions recognise the Commission’s role 
as Guardian of the Treaties (TEU and TFEU). Lately this 
respect found its expression in the inter-institutional 
agreement on Better Law-making of 9 March 2016500. 
It states in paragraph 25 last subparagraph that it is 
the Commission’s “institutional role to ensure that the 
Treaties and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union are respected.”501 The importance of 
an independent Commission is underlined e contrario 
by the experiences with less independent ‘secretariats’ 
in other regional international organisations. The lack 
of independence of the secretariats of some African 
RIOs has proven instrumental in the weakening of the 
impact of judgements of the regional courts502.
Empirically, the Commission has taken this task 
seriously. In the period from 2010 to 2015 it has 
brought more than 400 infringements to the European 
Court of Justice503 (Article 258 TFEU).  This number 
contrasts sharply with the few cases the Member States 
have brought against each other since the foundation 
of the EU504. 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
on 1 December 2009 this so-called ‘infringement 
procedure’ refers to infringement of Treaties (TEU and 
TFEU). Therefore, also a violation of the obligations of 
the Member States under the TEU can give raise to a 
procedure under Article 258 TFEU (details infra)505. 
The question has been asked whether the 
Commission`s role of Guardian of the Treaties and 
neutral broker has been weakened since the procedure 
for nominating the Commission President has been 
linked to the outcome of the elections to the European 
Parliament (´Spitzenkandidat´)506. From a political 
point of view, this change in procedure was not only 
seen as formally increasing the democratic legitimacy 
of the Commission President507 and the college of 
Commissioners as a whole but also as strengthening 
its position altogether508. Legally speaking, it has not 
changed the description of the Commission’s tasks and 
obligations under Article 17 TEU. Therefore it remains 
independent. 
This ‘politisation’ of the nomination of the Commission’s 
president has not changed the Commission’s obligation 
to be ‘non-partisan’ and act as a neutral defender 
of the European interest. A distinction needs to be 
made between the procedure for nomination and 
the actual exercise of the office. Whilst the former 
might be ‘partisan’ and political this does not imply 
that the latter needs to reflect this character. Such a 
distinction between nomination and exercise of the 
function is not only well known in politics509 but is also 
common practice in the case of nomination of judges 
at highest courts which often has political elements. 
Since they are obliged to obey only the constitution, 
they do have an ‘obligation of ingratitude’ towards the 
political parties who nominated them510. Different 
mechanisms such as majority decisions or the secrecy 
of deliberations, increase the judges’ independence 
from national interests511. The same applies by analogy 
also to the Members of the European Commission and 
its President. Since the Treaty obliges the Commission 
to act only in the common European interest, it would 
be violating this obligation if it acted on the basis 
of political affiliation. Procedurally, the collegiality 
principle and the ensuing risk for Commissioners’s 
reputation if they blindly follow orders from ‘their 
Member States’ are additional safeguards in this 
respect512. In the light of these arguments the position 
that the Commission has lost its independence due 
to the ‘Spitzenkandidat’ procedure of its nomination 
seems not convincing.
As we seen under the previous heading the ‘all-affected 
principle’and the very character of transnational 
problems show the need for finding transnational 
solutions. By bringing civil servants from different 
countries together the Commission as an emergent 
form of transnational government allows for more 
cosmopolitan and transnational identities and 
transnational public sector values513. Such transnational 
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values are, on the level of the European Union in 
particular reflected by Article 2 TEU and protected by 
its Article 7.
Procedures under Article 7 TEU are highly sensitive. 
Therefore, it is particularly important that the 
monitoring of the respect for those transnational values 
is ensured ‘sine ira et studio’, neutrally and impartially, 
respecting the Weberian concept of public civil 
servants514. When making decisions and when serving 
the citizen, the civil servants are guided by their own 
preferences and values515. Since those demands can 
only be fulfilled when the transnational values are part 
of the ones of the civil servants in question, the officials 
of the Commission seem to be well placed for this task.
7. Current Role of the ECJ
Article 269 TFEU limits the ECJ’s competences with 
regard to the protection of the Rule of Law expressly to 
procedural stipulations. This limitation in itself raises 
questions concerning its compatibility with the Rule of 
Law516. It seems that the intergovernmental conferences 
in Amsterdam and Nice showed that several Member 
States were reticent to give the ECJ any powers under 
Article 7 TEU.517 So the question is whether the buck 
stops there or, to the contrary, whether the ECJ does 
have powers established under the Treaties to protect 
the Rule of Law. 
Historically, the founders of the Communities 
established a relatively strong Court with a view to 
ensure an effective protection of the Rule of Law518. 
Often the decisions of the ECJ were instrumental in 
translating political initiatives into concrete advantages 
for the citizens519. Notwithstanding occasional criticism 
of some of its judgements the ECJ has constantly 
seen its powers confirmed and even extended, which 
is understood as confirming the Member States’ 
conviction that a strong ECJ as one if the salient 
features of EU law has passed the test of time520.
According to Article 19(1) TEU the ECJ ensures that 
in the interpretation and application of the Treaties 
(TEU and TFEU) the law is observed. The expression 
‘the rule of law’ is not expressly mentioned but the 
wording of Article 19 TEU is wide enough to cover it. 
The Treaties encompass both the values under Article 
2 TEU and the control mechanism of Article 7 TEU.
One of the core elements of the Rule of Law is judicial 
review of decision (see supra). It would be absurd if 
this did not apply to the review of the Rule of Law itself.
Empirically the ECJ has enhanced democratic 
accountability in a number of ways521. It protected the 
European citizens’ rights inter alia through upholding 
due process and by providing guidance in the 
interpretation through its interpretation of Union law 
and by ensuring respect for the institutional balance 
between the European Union institutions. With 
regard to democracy, it held in its landmark judgment 
‘Roquette Frère/Isoglucose’ that the participation of the 
European Parliament in the legislative process is an 
“essential factor in the institutional balance of the Treaty, 
reflecting the fundamental democratic principle that the 
peoples should take part in the exercise of power”. This 
democratic participation right is exercised through 
the intermediary of the European Parliament. Failing 
to respect this principle constitutes a fundamental 
formality which renders the measure concerned 
void522. It is interesting to note that the Council was the 
defendant in this case, which proves that sometimes 
not the representatives of the Member States but the 
European Union institutions protect democracy on the 
European level.
On the other hand, it is also clear from the ECJ’s case-
law that the principal of institutional balance523 alone 
cannot create competences524.
It would be a paradox to leave ECJ out of the equation 
of the Rule of Law. One of the essential elements of 
the Rule of Law is exactly the control of legality by 
the Courts.  The ECJ has clarified this in numerous 
judgments. This control is subjected to the system of 
legal protection as provided for by the Treaties. So 
what is the system provided for by the Treaties? In 
other words how can an act which violates the Rule of 
Law be subjected to the ECJ’s scrutiny?
In the light of the Court’s interpretation of the Treaty, 
the Court could consider itself competent to rule on 
a dispute under Article 7(1) TEU re the substantive 
determination of a clear risk of a serious breach of the 
Rule of Law. In my view, arguments on lex specialis do 
not prevent that.
First, unlike for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (Article 24(1) TEU) the Treaties do not expressly 
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exclude the ECJ’s jurisdiction in the matter of Protecting 
Fundamental Values; secondly, because Article 7 TEU 
is only lex specialis as far as its scope reaches. The 
ECJ has repeatedly found that the lex specialis rule is 
applicable only in so far as the special rule in effect 
regulates matters525. Article 7 TEU is limited to clear 
risks/serious and persistent breaches and, as far as the 
sanctions are concerned to the suspension of voting 
rights as defined by Article 7 TEU. Therefore it does 
not exclude for example a mere statement as to the 
violation under Article 258 TFEU, in particular since 
Article 258 TFEU is expressly applicable to violations 
of the obligations imposed under the Treaties (TEU 
and TFEU) (see infra).
This finding is corroborated by an analysis of the ECJ’s 
case-law concerning the elements of the Rule of Law. 
The ECJ has constantly held that judicial review of 
measures adopted by the Member States and the EU’s 
institutions is one of the core elements of the Rule of 
Law526. Remedies and procedures must be available for 
ensuring the conformity of European and Members 
State measures with primary Union law527.
Article 7 TEU is not confined to areas covered by 
Union law i.e. it is not restricted to matters over which 
the EU has competence. So it covers spheres where the 
Member States can act autonomously. This means that 
it is different from the European Union’s powers to 
respect fundamental rights when implementing Union 
law. The courts have always held that Member States 
are obliged to respect fundamental rights as general 
principles of Union law.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE 
COMMISSION’S PRACTICE 
WITH REGARD TO 
PROTECTING THE RULE OF 
LAW
In the following section I shall examine whether the 
Commission has lived up to this task in its practice 
with regard to protecting the Rule of Law. Before 
entering into the details it is useful to describe the 
risks an institution faces with when using enforcement 
mechanisms.
A. False positives and 
false negatives: risks of 
initiating an Article 7 TEU 
procedure 
1. General
Sanctions are never popular and sanctioning 
mechanisms might backfire and weaken the authority 
of European Union law528. These negative effects are 
obviously considerably bigger should the procedure 
fail. Before formally addressing Rule of Law issues 
in a Member State within the framework of Article 7 
TEU, the institutions, in particular the Commission, 
always need to analyse and weigh the consequences of 
‘getting it wrong’ or being ‘overruled’ by the Council. 
Due to the high majority threshold required by Article 
7 TEU, such a risk is considerable (see above). In other 
words, the institutions have to analyse in each case the 
practical consequences of their activity or inactivity 
for a) the Member State concerned, b) the citizens (in 
the respective Member State and in the EU as a whole; 
the ‘all affected principle’, see Part three), and c) the 
European Union as a whole529.
Both over-enforcement (false positives) and under-
enforcement (false negatives)530 bear considerable risks. 
False positives would imply that the Commission were 
to find a violation of Article 2 TEU and commence 
the Article 7 TEU procedure. However, in fine, the 
competent institution, the Council or the European 
Council, would reach the conclusion that there was no 
violation. In such a case, the political damage would be 
considerable. Starting an ‘Article 7 TEU like’ procedure 
against Austria inflicted lasting damage to the EU in 
that Member State, to the European Union as a whole 
and beyond (see above). What is probably still worse 
is that a negative decision would give additional 
legitimacy to the respective Member State, who would 
thence be confirmed in its ‘illiberal’ course. It will also 
have a uniting effect within the ‘indicted’ state and, 
as a corollary, alienate even more this Member State’s 
government and its population from the European 
Union and its institutions531. Instead of a reuniting 
effect, such a false positive would, on the contrary, 
increase the ‘US’ and ‘THEM’ feeling. The latter being 
a topos often times abused by populist movements532. 
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Therefore, from a legal and a political standpoint, the 
institutions should employ a cautious but firm and, 
above all, coherent approach.
A ‘false negative’ is to be understood as a situation 
where the European Union institutions do not 
commence an Article 7 TEU procedure, although 
the formal and substantial requirements would be 
met. Some authors severely criticize for example the 
absence of a “Pre-Article 7 TEU” procedure against 
Hungary533. A failure to condemn in terms of Rule 
of Law is sometimes understood as equivalent to an 
endorsement of the situation in the Member State 
concerned534. The first evaluation seems to disregard 
the problems an institution is facing when confronted 
with a threat to the fundamental values of a Member 
State; whereas the second exaggerates the effects of a 
‘false negative’. As in many other occasion what might 
be best must yield to what is practicable535.
Theoretically it appears, at first glance, convincing 
to apply the principle of ‘resist beginnings’ in cases 
of violation of the Rule of Law536. On second glance, 
already in theory, the reply is much more complex. 
The protection of fundamental values is superfluous 
when the threat to it is minimal, it might even violate 
its own premise to protect a ‘pluralistic society’; at the 
same time, it becomes ineffective when the threat to 
the fundamental values has reached already a certain 
level537. Also in practice the situation is complex for 
the institution having to take a decision. An institution 
venturing into the first application of Article 7 TEU or 
Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure needs to take other aspects 
into consideration. This application would mean to 
venture into terra incognita, which, as Professor Weiler 
rightly states, is in itself a scary prospect538. As another 
author put it: “Pioneering voyages can, as we all know, 
end in glory or catastrophe”539
Indisputably, ‘false negatives’ also give certain 
legitimacy to an illiberal course and risk a copy-cat 
effect in other Member States540. On the other hand, 
a ‘false negative’ lacks the formal rubber-stamping of 
a situation in a Member State. Even more importantly, 
the criticism voiced against the Commission’s alleged 
inactivity does not take into consideration the 
possibility of using informal mechanisms to solve a 
‘Rule of Law’ issue with a Member State541. We shall see 
in the Third Part that in the European Union dialogue 
is often the most adequate way of addressing Rule of 
Law and other conformity issues.
In evaluating the lack of use of the formal mechanism 
of Article 7 TEU, the consequences of a ‘false positive’ 
cannot be left out of sight. As we shall see in the 
following section the case of sanctions against Austria 
in 2000 has shown that such ‘false positives’ have 
serious negative consequences, such as legitimizing 
effects for the government creating Rule of Law issues 
and they have serious negative repercussions on the 
perception of the European Union and its institutions 
as such.
2. Example: Effects of a ‘false 
positive’: The ‘sanctions’ against 
Austria (2000)
Article 7 TEU has not been formally employed yet. 
Nevertheless, there was one practical example where 
a large majority of Member States acted in order to 
protect the European Union’s fundamental values. It 
was not a formal use of Article 7 TEU but came close. 
The facts leading to the ‘sanctions’ against Austria can 
be briefly summarised as follows.542 After elections in 
Austria, the FPÖ was likely to become a member of 
the government coalition in the year 2000. The FPÖ 
has been described as a ‘right wing populist party with 
extremist expressions’, whose party officials had made 
xenophobic statements.As a reaction, the Portuguese 
Presidency of the European Union, speaking in 
the name of 14 Member States, sent a statement 
to Austria on 31 January 2000 announcing several 
measures (‘sanctions’) should the FPÖ become part 
of the coalition government in Austria. The ‘sanctions’ 
announced in the letter included inter alia the 
renouncement of official bilateral contacts at a political 
level543; the denial of support for Austrian candidates 
seeking positions in international organisations, 
and, lastly, the reception of Austrian ambassadors to 
European Union capitals at a purely technical rather 
than political level544. Those ‘sanctions’ were formally 
not EU measures, but rather 14 bilateral coordinated 
moves545.
Although the letter did not expressly mention Article 
7 (new version) TEU, subsequent statements by the 
THIRD PART: 
The Rule of Law and its Protection by the European Union70
European Commission and the European Parliament 
referred to these provisions546. Contrary to the action 
of the 14 Member States, the Commission did not 
pursue a policy of isolating Austria. According to its 
then President, Romano Prodi, it saw the task of a 
supranational institution as binding its members to 
its values rather than isolating them547. The ‘sanctions’ 
were therefore lifted on 12 September 2000 after a 
report by ‘three wise men’ had suggested that Austria 
was not violating the values contained in Article 7 TEU 
(at the time Article 6 TEU)548.
Those ‘sanctions’ led to fierce criticism (terms such 
as ‘European mobbing’549,  Austria became “a pariah 
within the European Union”550 were used to describe 
the effects of the ‘sanctions’) and a ‘constitutional 
crisis’ in the European Union 551. One commentator 
even speculated that this ‘false negative’ would prevent 
Article 7 TEU from ever being used since the Union 
would explode were it to trigger the procedure ‘again’552. 
However, politically, the report of the ‘three wise men’ 
noted that the ‘sanctions’ by the 14 Member States 
had some positive effects by increasing awareness of 
the importance of European values and intensifying 
the efforts by the Austrian Government to defend 
them553. In addition, sections of the academic literature 
mention some other positive effects of the ‘sanctions’ 
against Austria: at a political level, they intensified the 
discussion on human rights in the European Union 
and, from a legal perspective, they led to a modification 
of the Treaties554. Indeed, in 2001, the Treaty of Nice 
introduced a new Article 7(1) TEU which allows for 
preventive actions in the case of ‘a clear risk’ of a ‘serious 
breach’ of one of the fundamental values referred to 
in Article 2 TEU. It is to be noted, however that the 
use of the ‘surveillance’ procedure is not a procedural 
condition for the use of the sanction procedure under 
Article 7(2) TEU. If this were the case, the European 
Union would not be able to react to urgent situations 
such as an undemocratic putsch555
On the other hand, the negative effects, such 
as a stirring-up of nationalistic feelings, were 
predominant556. The decision was taken at a time when 
12 of the 14 governments were ruled by parties which 
were members of the Socialist International557. This 
led to speculations by some commentators that the 
Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ), after having lost the 
elections, had been operational in convincing party 
friends in other Member States to intervene against 
Austria558.
The ‘letter of the 14’ had other unwanted consequences 
which, in the end, even rendered the ‘sanctions’ 
counterproductive. In Austria itself they produced a 
“rallying-round the flag effect” and gave rise to a wave of 
EU-scepticism. As a ripple effect they created suspicion 
towards the European Union in other small Member 
States559. In the light of this situation, the ‘wise men’ 
suggested lifting the sanctions560 but their mandate did 
not include a judgment on the legality of the measures561. 
Therefore, the report does not expressly address 
the legality of the sanctions. Commentators nearly 
unanimously reach the conclusion that the reaction of 
the 14 Member States was not only politically unwise 
but also illegal562. It possibly violated substantial legal 
principles including the proportionality principle563, 
circumvented the Treaty provision of Article 7 TEU 
(old version) itself, bearing in mind that the old 
version, before the modifications introduced by the 
Nice Treaty in 2001, did not contain the preventive 
mechanism of Article 7(1) TEU (‘clear risk of a serious 
breach’)564. Hence, at the time, only the ‘existence of a 
serious and persistent breach’ could trigger the ‘Rule of 
Law mechanism’. It is undisputed that those conditions 
had not been fulfilled in the case of Austria, since any 
possible threats to the values mentioned in Article 7 
TEU (new version) had not materialised at the time 
the ‘sanctions’ were adopted565.
From a procedural point of view, the ‘sanctions’ suffered 
the following legal flaws: they were not motivated 
and violated the right to be heard566; they infringed 
an essential procedural requirement since, contrary 
to Article 7(1) TEU (old version), the European 
Parliament had not been consulted prior to their 
adoption567. These violations by the 14 Member States 
taken together were also considered as infringing the 
principle of sincere cooperation as expressed in Article 
4(3) TEU (new version)568.
3. Lessons to be learned
The case of sanctions against Austria teaches us several 
important lessons for future use of the Article 7 TEU 
procedure:
THIRD PART: 
The Rule of Law and its Protection by the European Union71
a) Although the procedure has important political 
ramifications, approaches which are too obviously 
politically motivated must be avoided569, otherwise the 
credibility of the European Union as an organisation 
based on values risks being undermined. In cases 
where it is legally uncertain whether the conditions 
for triggering the Rule of Law procedure are fulfilled, 
an application of any Rule of Law procedure would 
be difficult to reconcile with the basic principles 
of subsidiarity and respect for the constitutional 
identity of the Member States. These are, in the end, 
an expression of the Rule of Law and the separation of 
powers within the European Union.
b) Respect for the procedural requirements such as 
the right to be heard and the obligation to motivate a 
decision is vital. Only if those central core procedural 
elements of the Rule of Law are respected will the action 
to protect or enforce the Rule of Law be credible and 
coherent. In order to have the necessary institutional 
support the participation of the – other -institutions 
during the whole procedure leading to sanctions is 
essential. 
On a more general level, the ‘Austrian case’ has shown 
that the Institutions should be careful but honest, 
principled and coherent570 in the use of Article 7 TEU. 
An unjustified use could trigger serious unwanted 
effects. In brief, it is essential that the European Union 
institutions act cautiously in order to avoid creating 
‘false positives’ with regard to the protection of the 
Rule of Law in the European Union.
B. General criticism of 
the Commission’s practice 
concerning threats to the 
Rule of Law Article 7 TEU
After having described the steps the institutions had 
taken with respect to Articles 2 and 7 TEU one author 
states: “This flurry of initiatives on the rule of law front 
is yet to lead, however, to concrete actions”571. Article 7 
TEU is referred to as a sort of “sleeping giant in the 
history of EU law”572. An Editorial of the Common 
Market Law Review was entitled: Safeguarding EU 
values in the Member States – Is something finally 
happening?”573. Other authors lament the Commission’s 
‘lack of political will to activate the new mechanism’574 
and predict ‘damaging effects of the further development 
of the Rule of Law in the EU and the EU’s credibility’575.
This harsh criticism seems, at best, only partially 
justified. It disregards the special character of the 
European Union described supra in part 2. Any action 
to be taken under Article 7 TEU has to respect the 
Member States’ constitutional identity, subsidiarity 
and the supra-nationality principle.
The ‘sleeping giant’ allegory raises the question of 
the historical dimension of Article 7 TEU. This 
provision was only introduced into the TEU by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1996. Compared to similar 
clauses in national systems and other international 
organisations (see supra Second Part) it is a relatively 
recent provision. We have seen in the Second Part 
that much older ‘homogeneity’ provisions and their 
enforcement mechanisms have either never or only 
very rarely been used.  On a comparative perspective 
the use of the ‘enforcement of homogeneity clauses’ 
is extremely rare. We have seen supra that neither in 
the Federal Republic of Germany nor in Spain have 
those mechanisms been used yet. Even in the US, and 
notwithstanding its comparatively long constitutional 
tradition, there are only a handful of cases where 
the ‘enforcement mechanism for homogeneity’ was 
used576. Also in other international organisations with 
a high level of integration, the use of the ‘homogeneity 
measures’ are particularly rare. The only examples 
are the Commonwealth, for example the exclusion of 
Zimbabwe, which did not produce the desired effect 
on the country’s policies (see Second Part).
Given the exceptional character of Article 7 TEU, 
the need for caution is inherent. We shall see infra 
that the situations which raised questions as to their 
compatibility with the Rule of Law were not identical 
and, hence, called for differentiated reactions. Those 
differences in situations required a difference in 
approach by the competent institutions, in particular 
the Commission577.
The criticism turned in particular around the 
alleged inactivity of the European Union institutions 
from 2012 on578. Several of those concerned real or 
perceived Rule of Law issues which had occurred prior 
to the 2014 communication579. To name just a view: the 
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deportation of Roma from France580, the concentration 
of media power in Italy581, the constitutional crises in 
Romania and Hungary.
On 13 January 2016, the situation in Poland has given 
rise to the first use of the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure 
established by the Commission in March 2014582. On 
1 June 2016 the Commission has issued the first ´rule 
of law opinion´, i.e. the first step in the Pre-Article 7 
TEU Procedure against Poland583. On 27 July 2016 
the Commission launched the second step in this 
procedure, the ‘rule of law recommendation’ which is 
public584. 
The situations described (with the exception of the 
case of Poland) have already been subject of in-depth 
analysis from a legal and political science point of 
view585. Therefore the present article will only briefly 
describe the similarities and to pointing at the 
particularities of each individual case.
The basic point of departure for the Union’s institutions 
is identical in all cases of alleged or presumed violations 
of the Rule of Law. In particular the Commission has to 
evaluate the risk between a ‘false positive’ and a ‘false 
negative’. Most of the cases mentioned have in common 
that the government in power tried to reinforce its 
power base by one or all of the following measures: 
Limiting media pluralism (Italy586, Hungary587, 
Poland588); hampering the work of NGOs (Hungary, 
Poland) trying to disturb the balance between the 
different branches of government by tilting it in favour 
of the governing party (Romania, Hungary, Poland) in 
particular by means of curbing the independence of 
the judiciary (Italy, Romania589, Hungary590, Poland591); 
attacking fundamental rights (France).
It is striking that in all but one of those cases592, we can 
observe classical attacks of illiberal governments with a 
view to influencing the democratic process of forming 
opinions. At times these measures were combined, in 
particular in Hungary and Poland, with an attempt to 
curb the established system of checks and balances. 
The first two examples, limiting media pluralism and 
hampering the work of NGOs seem to be ‘softer’593 
and less related to the Rule of Law than the others. 
Nevertheless, a correct understanding of the Rule of 
Law encompasses those measures too.
A free press as the ‘fourth estate’ is seen as playing 
an essential part in an effective system of checks and 
balances594. Free media and independent NGOs ensure 
also a certain political opposition, in particular in 
situations where there is no institutionalised opposition 
yet or anymore. Therefore they play a key role in 
creating and maintaining a viable democracy595. The 
High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism 
(HLG) considered a free and pluralistic media crucial 
for European democracy596. Additionally there seems 
to be a more direct link between limiting a free press 
and a more classical Rule of Law issue: authors note 
a correlation between curbing media pluralism and 
a lack of an independent judiciary597. This is small 
wonder since censorship and propaganda are typical 
tools of authoritarian and totalitarian systems, which 
use both598. Media can even at least indirectly play 
a role in maintaining the Rule of Law 599. They are 
definitely one of the core elements for monitoring and 
sanctioning actions of government600.
The parallels with what happened towards the end 
of the Weimar Republic (‘forced harmonisation’, 
‘Gleichschaltung’ see above First Part) are striking. 
Similarities with the situations faced by the protection 
mechanisms for democracy in Latin America 601(see 
supra Second Part) are also obvious. Nevertheless, the 
situations described supra show also important legal, 
factual and political differences. Those differences 
warrant, in our view, the differentiated approach the 
European Commission has adopted up to now.
Before embarking on a description of the differences 
in the situations and the reasons why they justify a 
differentiated reply by the Commission it is helpful 
to briefly recall the situation of an institution faced 
with a situation where the Rule of Law is threatened. 
As we have seen supra, the institutions always have 
to weigh the consequences of ‘getting it wrong’ or 
being ‘overruled’ by the Council, see Article 7(1) and 
(2) TEU against the usefulness of employing such a 
procedure. In other words, in each case they have to 
analyse the practical consequences for the citizens 
concerned (in the respective Member State and in 
the European Union as a whole, for the ‘all affected 
principle’ see supra in this Part) and for the European 
Union as a whole of its activity or inactivity.  Over-
enforcement (false positives) and under-enforcement 
(false negatives)602 bear considerable risks as we have 
seen in the case of Austria in 2000 (see supra in this 
Part).
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The ultimate goal of the enforcement of homogeneity 
clauses is to stop the threat to fundamental values. If 
this goal can be achieved without encountering the 
high risk of a false positive, it would seem that strong 
arguments speak in favour of following, the other, 
less risk-prone, path. A good example for this is how 
Norway handled the dispute with Hungary concerning 
the distribution of funds to Hungary by NGOs. After 
19 months of discussion during which the funds 
were blocked, the Hungarian authorities dropped the 
‘charges’ against the NGOs603.
Is political fear the real reason for the apparent lack of 
usage of Article 7 TEU or are there objective differences 
between the situations which had occurred before 
the Polish constitutional crisis? Not entirely; at least 
two arguments of an entirely legal character speak in 
favour of the legality and opportunity of the approach 
chosen by the Commission. The first is the need for the 
Commission to respect the proportionality principle604. 
In other words: it should not be biting, if barking does 
the job605. The second argument is the subsidiarity 
principle on the basis of which Article 7 TEU measures 
can only be taken as ultima ratio.
In my view there are several differences between the 
situations in France, Italy, Romania and Hungary and 
the one in Poland.
Ratione temporis, the majority of those Rule of Law 
problems occurred before March 2014  when the 
Commission adopted the Article 7 Framework. 
Therefore a potential Article 7 TEU procedure would 
have had to face the majority requirements of 4/5 of 
the Member States in the case of Article 7(1) TEU and 
unanimity in the case of Article 7(2) TEU.  Obtaining 
such a majority would have been no easy task – in 
other words, the risk of false negatives would have 
been considerable.
Such tactical considerations are not the only ones 
pleading for choosing different ways to solve the issues 
regarding the Rule of Law previously described.
There are also differences ‘ratione materiae’. The Article 
7 TEU procedure is not an objective in itself. Its purpose 
is to remedy the situation of a threat to the Rule of 
Law. In this respect, it is similar to the infringement 
procedure under Article 258 TFEU. Its primary goal 
is also to make Member States comply with and fulfil 
their obligations under the Treaties by bringing the 
non-compliant behaviour as quickly and effectively 
as possible to an end606. Ceasing illegal behaviour is a 
much clearer expression of promoting respect for the 
Rule of Law than punishment607.
One other factor plays an important role in this 
context: At the end of the day the situation can only be 
changed by the Member State itself, since the EU is not 
equipped with an effective executing mechanism as the 
President of the US (see infra First Part). Therefore the 
two options which are open are either to rely on the 
institutions of the Member State itself to remedy the 
situation or to incite the Member State concerned via 
‘pressure from Brussels/Luxembourg’.
The experience with management mechanisms608, as 
opposed to the enforcement mechanism of Article 258 
TFEU, with regard to infringements is also useful in 
this context:
Informal mechanisms such as SOLVIT609, the Internal 
Market Scoreboard and the EU-Pilot Procedure610 
have proven effective in addressing cases of wrong 
application of EU-law611 and, therefore, in ensuring 
compliance of national law with EU-law612. They 
foster cooperation and dialogue on two levels: on the 
one hand, between different layers of administration 
within one Member state and, on the other, between 
the Member State concerned and the Commission613. 
Negotiation is rightly seen as the prime means of 
promoting compliance614.
From a legal point of view, subsidiarity also speaks 
in favour of leaving the solution of a threat to the 
Rule of Law to the national system as long as it is 
still functioning. If an effective system of checks and 
balances is already abolished or about to be abolished 
the situation is obviously different615. In such a situation 
a solution of the Rule of Law issues on the Member 
State’s level becomes impossible or, at least, unlikely.
The institutions of the Member State threatening the 
Rule of Law can remedy the situation themselves if – 
and only if - the system of checks and balances is still 
working. Contrary to the situation in some federal 
states we have seen in the Second Part (see in particular 
the ‘Wallace case’),  the EU cannot use coercion to 
enforce Union law against a recalcitrant Member 
State616. In other words, the European Union cannot 
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wield a sword or deploy the army to ensure respect for 
the Rule of Law.
In the following section we shall see that the informal 
approach followed by the Commission incited Member 
States to undertake steps to align the national situation 
with the values of the European Union617. Therefore 
the Commission fulfilled its task as Guardian of the 
Treaties by engaging in a dialogue with the Member 
States concerned without using the formal Article 7 
TEU mechanism.
In the case of Romania, the situation was solved in a 
first step by political pressure by the Council and more 
direct messages from the Commission’s President618. 
Later on the Commission established a Cooperation 
and Verification Mechanism619.
In the case of France it seems that the concentrated 
forced evacuation and expulsion actions against 
Roma ceased after the Commission had threatened 
to start an infringement procedure620. Additionally 
French tribunals declared some measures illegal621. 
Therefore no complete breakdown of the legal system 
of checks and balances existed. Consequently, had the 
Commission employed the Article 7 TEU procedure 
in this case, it would probably have violated the 
subsidiarity principle.
In the case of Italy it was the Italian legal and political 
system itself that foiled several of the attempts either 
to further concentrate media power, to avoid ‘biased’ 
judges, to curb the powers of the constitutional court 
or to have laws ‘ad personam’ adopted622. Contrary to 
the opinion of several commentators623, political and 
legal reasons spoke against initiating an Article 7 TEU 
procedure against Italy.  These examples given above 
have shown that the institutions of the EU were correct 
in assuming that Italy’s legal and political system itself 
would be able to remedy the threat to the Rule of Law 
624. Such a cautious approach is also in line with the 
character of Article 7 TEU as an instrument of last 
resort625.
Political reasons speak also against using an Article 
7 TEU procedure in cases where the Member State 
concerned still disposes of a functioning system of 
checks and balances. In such a case the Commission 
would face the risk of taking sides in a political conflict. 
In order to maintain its role as ‘honest broker’ and 
objective Guardian of the Treaties, the Commission 
should avoid this impression.
Against this background, we shall briefly examine the 
‘Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure’. We shall have a look at 
its legality and the first case of its application.
C. The Case of the Pre-
Article 7 TEU Procedure
1.Introduction
We have already seen that the Commission has tackled 
Rule of Law problems in the Member States by different 
means. It searched for an intermediate way between the 
thorny path of Article 7 TEU, called a ‘nuclear option’626 
and the difficulties in effectively using it because of the 
majorities needed627 and the soft powers of dialogue.
As a reaction to those practical difficulties in initiating 
the Article 7(1) TFEU mechanism, the Commission 
adopted in March 2014 a Communication entitled “A 
new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law”628. It 
is the result of discussions following an initiative by 12 
foreign ministers to establish a mechanism to improve 
the protection of the fundamental values, in particular 
human rights629 on different levels.
The Commission adopted the Pre-Article 7 TEU 
Procedure since during the first years of the 2010s 
developments in several Member States showed that 
it was difficult to set the Article 7 TEU procedure in 
motion. The reasons for this are manifold. To mention 
just a few:
• national governments are reluctant to target each 
other with sanctions630;
• the threshold for arriving at a suspension is 
particularly high (4/5 of the Member States, see 
Article 7 (1)TEU
• as shown above the example of Austria as a ‘false 
negative’631 hangs like a Damocles’ sword over any 
future use of such a mechanism
• naming the Article 7 TEU procedure a ‘nuclear 
option’ did not necessarily increase the likelihood 
of its use; since it implies that no reasonable 
politician would employ it
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In the light of those difficulties, on 6 June 2013 the Justice 
and Home Affairs Council asked the Commission to 
“take forward the debate in line with the Treaties on 
the possible need for and shape of a collaborative and 
systematic method to tackle these issues”632. In 2013 and 
in 2014 the European Parliament also invited all the 
institutions of the European Union to launch a joint 
reflection and debate on how to equip the Union with 
the necessary tools to fulfil its Treaty obligations on 
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. 
At the time the European Parliament underlined the 
importance of “avoiding any risks of applying double 
standards among its Member States and stressed the 
importance of ensuring continued compliance with the 
fundamental values of the Union and the requirement of 
democracy and the rule of law”633.
In the wake of these requests the Commission also 
organized a conference during which the different 
options were discussed with academia, practitioners 
and judges634.
In reaction to the situation in several Member States 
and following the requests by the other EU institutions 
to find a more efficient way of dealing with possible 
threats to the Rule of Law the Commission adopted a 
Communication635. The Commission understands this 
‘Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure’ as a new framework 
within the context of the Commission competences as 
provided for by the existing Treaties636. The procedures 
provided for by Article 7(1) and (2) TEU are not 
always appropriate to quickly respond to threats to the 
rule of law in a Member State637; therefore the need to 
find practical and rapid solutions to situations where 
the Fundamental Values are at risk called for a new 
mechanism.
The Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure has, according 
to the Commission’s understanding, the following 
characteristics:
• it does not replace the existing Article 7 TEU 
procedure;
• it aims at ensuring an effective and coherent 
protection of the rule of law and, more broadly, 
at contributing to the objectives of the Council 
of Europe, including on the basis of the expertise 
of the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law638;
• it only concerns threats to the Rule of Law of 
a systemic nature, i.e. threats to the political, 
institutional and/or legal order of a Member State 
as such, its constitutional structure, separation of 
powers, the independence or impartiality of the 
judiciary, or its system of judicial review including 
constitutional justice;
• it will only be activated when national “rule of law 
safeguards” fail639;
• these objectives are to be achieved by establishing 
a dialogue with the concerned Member State in 
order to find solutions640.
The reactions to the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure 
were mixed. Some concerned the establishment of 
the mechanism as such, whereas other criticized the 
Commission for not using it in specific cases. Some 
authors hold that it “falls short of what is required to 
effectively address internal threats to EU values” but, 
at the same time prefer it largely to “the Council’s 
alternative proposal to hold an annual rule of law 
dialogue”641. Others welcome it since its character as 
a monitoring tool reflects the “profound and general 
concept of mutual responsibility for the respect for 
common values by all Member States” and might help 
to avoid ‘pathological situations”642. It is also heralded 
as an important visible confirmation of the importance 
the Rule of Law enjoys in the European Union643. The 
Commission’s initiative to adopt the Communication 
is described as ‘courageous’644. Some academic authors 
welcomed the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure as an 
expression of the Commission’s competences under 
Article 17(1) TEU645.
The European Parliament asked the Commission to use 
the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure against Hungary646. 
The Commission did not follow this request which 
was met with criticism by the European Parliament647 
and certain parts of academia648. Having asked the 
Commission to use the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure 
implies that the European Parliament accepts it as 
being, in principle, a legal tool for ensuring compliance 
with the values of Article 2 TEU. Hence the European 
Parliament seems to accept that the Commission acted 
in the framework of its competences when it adopted 
the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure.
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The Council, for its part, did not follow the same path. 
Its Legal Service considered the Pre-Article 7 TEU 
Procedure an ultra vires act and, therefore, illegal649. 
This opinion is, at best, doubtful650. It merits a more 
detailed analysis, since the legality of the Pre-Article 
7 TEU Procedure is the basis for the Commission’s 
dialogue on the situation in Poland. Some authors 
speculated that this opinion explains the Commission’s 
hesitations as to the use of the Pre-Article 7 TEU 
Procedure651.
The Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure is supposed to find 
ways for the Commission to fulfil its role as Guardian of 
the Treaties in a situation where it suspects that the rule 
of law is at risk in a Member State. In the introduction 
to its Work Programme for 2014 the Commission 
suggests to activate the mechanism only in situations 
where there is a serious, systemic risk to the rule of law, 
and triggered by pre-defined benchmarks652.
The situation is politically very sensitive. 
Normally, in cases of a suspected breach of EU 
law, the Commission starts an infringement 
procedure according to Article 258 TFEU. 
In cases of “a clear risk of a serious breach” by a 
Member State of the values referred to in Article 2, 
the TEU provides for a special procedure in Article 7 
TEU. Under this provision the Commission (as well as 
1/3 of the Member States or the European Parliament) 
can send a reasoned proposal to the Council, initiating 
such a procedure.
The Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure is meant to be an 
initial procedural step aiming at either finding an 
informal solution to threats to the Rule of Law or for 
preparing the reasoned proposal under Article 7 TEU.
2. Legality of the Pre-Article 7 TEU 
Procedure as a procedure analogous 
to the EU-Pilot Procedure
The question has to be asked which procedural steps 
the Commission is legally entitled to undertake before/
instead of using its right to initiative under Article 
7 TEU. The Council Legal Service sees in the Pre-
Article 7 TEU Procedure an aliud to the Article 7 TEU 
procedure.
It is suggested that the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure 
is to be considered a procedure analogous to the 
one of ‘EU Pilot’ in the framework of infringement 
procedures. Therefore it is not an ‘aliud’ but merely 
formalises a necessary procedural step before the 
Commission can use its – formal - right of initiative 
under Article 7 TEU. As we will see this procedure has 
a three advantages: first, that the analogous EU-Pilot 
procedure has been accepted by the European Court 
of Justice; secondly; it shows that the Commission 
has learned its lessons from the experience of the 
‘Austrian’ case where the right to be heard had not been 
respected653 and thirdly that, at least in theory, it allows 
for an amicable solution of the potential Rule of Law 
conflict, before a formal procedure will have created 
‘trenches’ between the institutions of the European 
Union and the Member States concerned. Before 
embarking on this evaluation exercise it is helpful to 
recall briefly the main characteristics of the EU-Pilot 
procedure and then compare it with the Pre-Article 7 
TEU Procedure. 
2.1 Main characteristics of the 
EU-Pilot Procedure
The EU-Pilot procedure was introduced by the 
Commission’s 2007 communication (‘A Europe 
of Results – Applying Community Law’)654. The 
communication laid down the Commission’s policy 
for improving the application of Union law. It aims 
at providing more rapid answers to citizens and 
businesses and solutions to problems, including 
correction of infringements before entering into 
formal infringement procedures.655 EU-Pilot was one 
of the key components of this new policy. The system 
was launched in 2008. In the meantime all Member 
States participate in EU-Pilot.
Pre-infringement discussions between the Commission 
and Member State authorities before sending the 
letter of formal notice (Article 258 TFEU) had always 
existed. With the introduction of EU-Pilot they have 
been given a clearer and more efficient structure. EU-
Pilot provides a common online platform for such 
discussions and has introduced binding time-limits for 
both the Member States and the Commission. Given 
that cases should, in principle, be dealt with within 20 
weeks EU-Pilot dialogue facilitates speedy resolution 
of problems.
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In December 2011 the Commission presented the 
Second Evaluation Report656 on the operation of EU-
Pilot and it will continue to report on the use of EU-
Pilot in its Annual Reports on the Application of Union 
law. In its 29th Annual Report on the Application of 
EU-Law the Commission concluded that the problem 
solving discussions under EU-Pilot are working.  They 
allowed for timely resolution of nearly two thirds of 
potential infringements in 2011657. The proportion has 
risen to three-fourths in 2014658.
2.2 Comparison between Article 7 TEU 
And Article 258/260 TFEU
Article 7 TEU provides for a three-step procedure. 
First, on the basis of a reasoned proposal which can 
be sent inter alia by the Commission, the Council 
may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious 
breach by a Member State of the values referred to in 
Article 2 TEU.659 Before making such a determination, 
the Council has to hear the Member State in question 
(Article 7(1) TEU). In a second step, the European 
Council may, on a proposal for instance by the 
Commission, determine the existence of a serious and 
persistent breach of the values referred to in Article 
2 TEU. In a third step, the Council may impose the 
sanctions described in Article 7 (3) TEU (e.g. loss of 
voting rights in Council).
Under Article 258 TFEU the Commission initiates 
the formal procedure with the letter of formal notice. 
Traditionally there have been contacts between the 
Commission and the Member State concerned before 
that stage (see in this section below).
Both procedures provide for several procedural 
steps before sanctions may be applied: 
According to Article 258/260 TFEU two pre-trial 
exchanges have to take place between the Commission 
and the Members State concerned (letter of formal notice 
and reasoned opinion) before an application can be sent 
to the European Court of Justice (Article 258 TFEU). 
Only in a ‘second infringement procedure’ (exception: 
non-communication cases) the ECJ may apply sanctions 
(Article 260 TFEU); in this case only one pre-trial 
exchange (reasoned opinion) is requested before the 
application can be sent to the European Court of Justice. 
What are the procedural requirements under Article 7 
TEU? The Council determines whether there is a clear 
risk of a serious breach (para. 1) and the European 
Council determines existence of serious and persistent 
breach (para. 2). Only in a third step the Council may 
decide about sanctions (para. 3).
Ratione materiae the standards of Article 7 TEU are 
considerably more stringent than the ones for a ‘normal 
violation’ under Article 258 TFEU. This goes for the 
degree of the violation (only a ‘serious’ breach, whereas 
under Article 258 TFEU any breach is sufficient) and 
the legal values concerned (only the basic values 
of the EU, such as the Rule of Law, democracy and 
fundamental rights, whereas under Article 258 TFEU 
any infringement of any rule of Union-law can be 
challenged, according to the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
there is ‘no de minimis rule’).
Given the importance of the violation at stake, a 
reasoned proposal under Article 7(1) TEU has to 
be based on a sound factual and legal analysis. A 
close cooperation between the Member State and 
the Commission is at least extremely useful if not 
absolutely necessary in this respect.
A difference between the two procedures concerns the 
standard of proof required. Whereas in an infringement 
procedure under Article 258 TFEU the Commission 
bears the full burden of proof for the infringement by 
the Member State, Article 7(1) TEU (‘clear risk’) is less 
severe in that respect.660
Procedures under Article 7 TEU have much wider 
political and, potentially economical, repercussions 
than infringement procedures. I would not go as far 
as Schmitt von Sydow who describes Article 7 TEU as 
a ‘political mechanism’661. In my view, it is true that, 
on one hand, the sanctions are political and that the 
procedure requests a number of evaluations which 
might involve political choices. On the other hand, at 
the same time, the procedure is prescribed by law and 
the criteria are essentially legal. Finally, as well with 
regard to the infringement procedures under Article 
258 TFEU, political choices have to be made which 
does not mean that the infringement mechanism is a 
political one.
Procedures under Article 7 TEU can have serious 
consequences for the Member State concerned even 
before the existence of a ‘clear risk’ under Article 7(1) 
TEU is pronounced (e.g. lack of trust of investors, see 
for Poland after the change in government662).
THIRD PART: 
The Rule of Law and its Protection by the European Union78
Hence it is obvious that the Commission and the 
Member State concerned have at least a vital interest, if 
not a legal obligation663 in entering into contact before 
sending a reasoned proposal under Article 7(1) TEU 
to the Council.  According to the principle of sincere 
cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU) it can be argued that 
the Commission might be even legally obliged to 
enter in such a discussion before using its right of 
initiative under Article 7(1) TEU. Actually this interest 
is threefold: firstly, as in the EU-Pilot procedure, 
such a ‘partnership approach’ could help gathering 
the necessary information. Secondly, since the values 
at stake are more fundamental than the ones in an 
infringement procedure, the Commission is a fortiori 
interested in finding a speedy solution and in ensuring 
rapidly respect for those fundamental values. Lastly 
the ‘false positive’ of Austria (see supra in this Part) has 
shown that the procedural right to be heard is essential 
in cases concerning the ROL. It would be absurd not to 
grant it since it is one of the indisputable elements of 
the Rule of Law.
In my view the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure can be 
understood as a ‘Rule of Law Pilot’ procedure. The 
Article 258 TFEU pilot procedure has been approved 
by the General Court. 
2.3 Application of existing 
jurisprudence
In my view the lawfulness of the Pre-Article 7 
TEU Procedure follows by analogy from existing 
jurisprudence of the Union courts.
In a case where the Commission had decided not to 
follow up on a complaint, the applicants had challenged 
the ‘EU-Pilot’ procedure664. In their view it was an ‘aliud’ 
compared to the infringement procedure as foreseen 
by Article 258 TFEU. Consequently, the applicants 
contended that the Commission was not competent 
to adopt such a procedure. The General Court rejected 
their claims with the following reasoning:
“Even if the EU Pilot procedure is not expressly 
provided for by the Treaty, this does not mean 
by itself that it has no legal basis. The EU Pilot 
procedure results from the inherent powers of 
the Commission to control the respect for EU 
law by the Member States. A mechanism or a 
procedure for the exchange of information which 
precedes the formal opening of an infringement 
procedure is inevitable in order to proceed with 
the first factual verifications and to find the first 
indications for a possible violation of EU-law. 
This is exactly the goal the EU Pilot procedure 
pursues; it formalises the first information 
exchanges between the Commission and the 
Member States concerning possible violation of 
EU-law. Under these circumstances (…) the EU 
Pilot procedure gives a structure to the steps the 
Commission has traditionally undertaken after 
either having received a complaint or acted on 
its own initiative. (…).665
In this order the General Court recognises expressly 
the Commission’s authority to formalise a ‘pre-Article 
258 TFEU’ procedure. This authority is based on 
the institution’s inherent powers of the Commission 
as Guardian of the Treaties. The latter competence 
comprises the respect for the fundamental values. 
Given the similarities of the two procedures (see above) 
the same reasoning can be applied to the Pre-Article 7 
TEU Procedure. An exchange of information prior to 
the formal opening of a procedure is a fortiori necessary 
in the case of Article 7 TEU due to the vagueness of the 
terms used, the complexity of the issues involved, the 
necessary respect for the constitutional identity of the 
Member State concerned, its character as ‘ultima ratio’ 
and the seriousness of the claimed violation.  
In such cases it belongs to the implied competence 
of the Commission as Guardian of the Treaties to 
structure a dialogue between the Commission and the 
Member State concerned666. The ultra vires argument 
used by the Council’s Legal Service is, therefore, not 
convincing.
It is interesting to note that, in its opinion referred to 
earlier, the Council’s Legal Service does not discuss the 
effects of this order on the lawfulness of the Pre-Article 
7 TEU Procedure. It is even more surprising since the 
opinion is dated 27 May 2014; therefore the Council’s 
Legal Service should have been aware of the Court 
Order issued on 10 March 2014. In my view it deserved 
at least some discussion in its opinion. 
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2.4 Conclusion: Lawfulness of the 
Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure
The Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure can be understood 
as a ‘Rule of Law-Pilot’. It provides a clear procedural 
framework for the Commission’s actions using its right 
of initiative under Article 7 TEU. On the procedural 
side it has several advantages. To name just a few: by 
setting the Member State clear deadlines for replying 
to its questions and, in turn, accepting to react speedily 
itself, it creates legal certainty and grants the right to 
be heard.
With regard to the substance, i.e. the objective of 
finding rapid solutions to threats to the Rule of Law the 
Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure has also positive aspects: 
The Member State concerned can adapt or correct 
its contentious behaviour at an early stage. Thus it 
allows, potentially, for an early respect for the most 
fundamental values the European Union is built upon. 
The Commission can rely on a procedure which has 
proven to be effective and which allows for a structured 
approach. 
D. Criticism of using the of 
Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure 
against Poland but not 
against Hungary
The European Parliament asked the Commission 
in December 2015 to use this Pre-Article 7 TEU 
Procedure with regard to Hungary667.
In order to understand the Commission’s differentiated 
approach it is helpful to compare the situation in 
Poland with the one in Hungary. Legally, the Hungarian 
government undertook several isolated steps which, 
taken together, raised serious issues with regard to the 
Rule of Law. Several of the isolated actions such as the 
massive replacement of judges668 and the interference 
with the independence of the Data Protection Officer669 
were successfully attacked by the Commission by 
means of infringement procedures under Article 
258 TEU. At the same time, many of the ‘suspicious’ 
activities were adopted via constitutional amendments 
making it more difficult to prove their incompatibility 
with the fundamental values.
In the case of Poland, the opinion of the Venice 
Commission670 shows clearly that the direct attack on 
the authority of the constitutional court’s authority 
has a different quality with regard to the Rule of Law. 
Respect for judgements of constitutional courts is 
undisputedly the very essence of the Rule of Law and 
the lack of it undermines the other fundamental values, 
democracy and fundamental rights671. The Member 
States do not enjoy any discretion in this regard. This 
absence of discretion is of primordial importance when 
establishing the seriousness of a violation. According 
to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 
in the context of establishing non-contractual liability 
of the European Union the absence of discretion 
indicates that the breach of an obligation was serious672. 
We have seen above that this jurisprudence can be 
applied by analogy to the definition of what constitutes 
a ‘serious’ breach in the meaning of the Pre-Article 7 
TEU Procedure.
The opening of the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure 
with regard to Poland received mixed reactions from 
commentators. Some critical voices describe the 
differences between the situation in Hungary and 
Poland as merely political, pointing in particular at 
the Fidesz party’s heavier weight in the European 
Parliament than the one of the PiS, the ruling party in 
Poland673.
One of the most prolific scholars on the Rule of 
Law describes the opening of the Pre-Article 7 TEU 
Procedure with regard to Poland as “an act of short-
sighted naïveté, or simple sloppiness in legal reasoning? 
Could it be an attack on the effet utile of Article 7?674. 
He also mentions four points of criticism against the 
Commission’s approach with regard to Poland. We 
shall examine them in turn:
First, in his view, using the Pre-Article 7 TEU 
Procedure procedure implies that the Commission is 
of the opinion that the requirements for Article 7(1) 
TEU are not met. He considers this position is most 
likely wrong and, therefore, the Pre-Article 7 TEU 
procedure would only lead to a loss of time.
This inference from using the Pre-Article 7 TEU 
Procedure is not convincing. As we have already seen 
in this Part, the Commission created this procedure 
in order to structure the dialogue with the Member 
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State before entering into a formal Article 7 TEU 
procedure. Due to its high procedural thresholds the 
latter carries considerable risks (‘false negatives’, see 
above). Therefore, and given that at the end of the day 
it is only the Member State which can effectively ensure 
compliance, it would seem that entering into a dialogue 
is not a ‘loss of time’ but rather a necessary procedural 
stage before formalising any steps under Article 7 TEU. 
This position is confirmed by the statement made by 
First Vice-President of the European Commission 
Frans Timmermans on 1 June 2016 when announcing 
the adoption of a ‘Rule of Law’ opinion. He referred to 
the dialogues as intensive and constructive675.
Secondly, the same author doubts the willingness of the 
Polish authorities to enter into a dialogue at all. As well 
this argument is legally not convincing. The European 
Court of Justice has repeatedly underlined that the 
European Union is a community based on trust in 
the compliance of Member States676. In a recent case 
concerning the relation between Member States the 
ECJ clarified the limitations of the principles of mutual 
recognition and mutual trust between Member States. 
Factually the case concerned a possible refusal to 
execute an arrest warrant based on the possibility that 
the destination Member State could employ methods 
amounting to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment.
Given the seriousness of the possible violation of the 
most fundamental of European values ratione materiae 
in the case decided it would seem that these findings 
can be applied a fortiori to the case concerning the Pre-
Article 7 TEU Procedure with regard to Poland. Also 
ratione personae they can be applied mutatis mutandis 
to situations arising between the Commission and the 
Member States, such as in the case concerning Poland.
As outlined above, the EU is a “Community based 
on the mutual trust that the common values will be 
recognised in the EU”677, therefore limitations to these 
basic principles can be applied only ‘in exceptional 
circumstances’678.
The ECJ defines the criteria as follows: there must be 
evidence of a real risk679; such circumstances have to be 
based on information that is objective, reliable, specific 
and properly updated680. Procedurally, it is necessary 
to contact the ‘target’ Member State before applying 
a limitation in order to obtain information on the 
concrete case681.
Transferring these findings of an extremely strict 
scrutiny for limitations to the principle of mutual trust 
to the opening of the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure leads 
to the following result: the Commission would have 
been badly advised, if had it relied on this exception 
to the principle of mutual trust. Presupposing the 
unwillingness of the Polish authorities to fulfil their 
obligation of sincere cooperation could easily have 
been considered as not granting the Polish authorities 
the right to be heard. It would have amounted to 
repeating the mistakes made in the ‘case against 
Austria’ in 2000682.
The third argument is of an entirely procedural nature: 
first, Kochenov sustains that by employing the Pre-
Article 7 TEU Procedure the Commission would create 
a legitimate expectation that it has become a necessary 
precondition for employing Article 7 TEU. This would 
make the use of the genuine Article 7 TEU procedure 
more difficult.
As well this argument is not convincing when having a 
closer look at the relevant texts. In its Communication 
of March 2014, the Commission stated expressly that 
the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure does “not prevent the 
mechanisms set out in Article 7 TEU being activated 
directly, should a sudden deterioration in a Member 
State require a stronger reaction from the EU”683. For the 
very reasons for adopting such a procedure it is clear, 
that the direct recourse to Article 7 TEU would be 
subject to further requirements. Therefore, the actual 
one-time-use of the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure with 
regard to Poland does not seem to have an effect going 
beyond the wording of the Communication.
The last argument links the attitude of the Hungarian 
government to the difficulty of obtaining unanimity in 
Council under Article 7(2) TEU to the deployment of 
the Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure. It is as difficult to 
understand as the author’s suggestions to, on the one 
hand to “forget about the Pre-Article 7 procedure”, and 
on the other “do not pursue one recalcitrant Member 
State when it is known that there are more than one 
and unanimity is required”. I cannot grasp how this 
statement rhymes with the criticism voiced against the 
Commission that it would weaken Article 7 TEU when 
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suggesting, at the same time, that Article 7 TEU should 
never be used if no unanimity can be obtained in the 
European Council. Does this imply that complete 
inactivity is considered preferable to starting a dialogue 
with a view to improving the situation? Certainly not, 
since the same authors stated that by adopting the Pre-
Article 7 TEU Procedure “the Commission has fulfilled 
its duty as guardian of the Treaties”684. He even asked 
“the Commissioner in charge of the rule of law to stop 
talking the talk and start walking the walk”685. In my 
view, this is exactly what it did when opening the Pre-
Article 7 TEU Procedure with regard to Poland.
More positive comments referred to the Pre-Article 
7 TEU Procedure with regard to Poland as a more 
“conducive alternative” to Article 7 TEU686.
IV. CAN THE ECJ PLAY A 
MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE 
PROTECTION OF THE RULE 
OF LAW DE LEGE LATA? 
A. Can Article 258 TFEU be 
used for presumed violations 
of the Rule of Law by Member 
States?
Since the entry into force of the so-called Lisbon Treaty 
on 1 December 2009 this so-called ‘infringement 
procedure’ refers to infringement of Treaties (TEU 
and TFEU). Therefore its ambit is not limited to the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
but includes the TEU and, therefore the Fundamental 
Values contained in Article 2 TEU. The opposite 
opinion expressed by some authors687 overlooks the 
fact that the Treaty of Lisbon extended the competence 
of the European Court of Justice to the Treaties (TEU 
and TFEU). The judgement of 2004688 which is quoted 
as authority for the opposite opinion was pronounced 
prior to the amendments of the TEU and TFEU by 
the ‘Treaty of Lisbon’. Therefore, in principle, also the 
obligations of the Member States under the TEU can 
give rise to a procedure under Article 258 TFEU. The 
Commission has constantly underlined that the Pre-
Article 7 TEU Procedure is without prejudice to its 
competences under Article 258 TFEU689.
We have already seen in this Part that Article 7 TEU is 
only lex specialis to Articles 258 and 259 TFEU as far as 
its ambit (sanctions foreseen and conditions for their 
deployment) reaches. It does not generally exclude 
opening infringement procedures for violations of the 
Member States’ obligations with regard to fundamental 
values.
In the framework of the protection of fundamental 
values such violations could, for instance, consist in a 
lack of cooperation in a Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure 
(Article 4(3) first indent TEU). The ECJ has found that 
a Member State is obliged to help the Commission in 
its task to monitor the application of Union law. If the 
Member State itself holds the information necessary 
for the effective exercise of this competence, it must 
transmit the ‘self-incriminating’ evidence to the 
Commission690.
In evaluating the situation in a Member State with 
regard to the Rule on Law the Commission largely 
depends on information about the national law and 
practice. If the Member State concerned does not 
provide this information, it might be found in violation 
of its obligation of sincere cooperation691. 
In case of either a permanent obstruction or a series 
of measures by one Member States which threaten 
the Rule of Law, the jurisprudence concerning the 
administrative practices, see above in this Part, could 
be applied by analogy.
These examples show that, contrary to the more 
intergovernmental approaches of many other 
international organisations (see above Second Part), 
in the European Union supranational mechanisms 
play a role in the protection of the Rule of Law. As 
a consequence, recalcitrant Member States cannot 
entirely rely on political means in order to avoid a 
control of their compliance with Article 2 TEU. 
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B. Could a Pre-Article 7 TEU 
Procedure be challenged by 
the Member State concerned?
The question appears whether the ECJ could be invoked 
by a Member State against which the Pre-Article 7 TEU 
Procedure has been started. A possible procedural way 
for the member state concerned of contesting such 
an act could be Article 263 TFEU. According to some 
authors the result of such a challenge would be difficult 
to predict692.
In my view the chances of success of such a challenge 
would be extremely limited. Independently from the 
arguments presented above concerning the legality of 
the Commission’s Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure, such a 
claim would probably already be inadmissible.
According to Article 263 TFEU a measure can only be 
attacked, if it is intended to produce legal effects. The 
Pre-Article 7 TEU Procedure does not produce such 
effects. In my view the jurisprudence of the Court with 
regard to the reasoned opinion and to the letters sent 
in the framework of claiming own resources from the 
member states can be applied by analogy to the situation 
at hand. The General Court has recently confirmed 
that only a judgment under Article 258 or 259 TFEU 
can validly determine the obligations of Member 
States and declare the illegality of a measure adopted 
by a Member State693. Although the Commission is 
free to express its opinion, such declarations do not 
produce legal effects and, therefore, do not constitute 
challengeable legal acts under Article 263 TFEU694.
CONCLUSIONS
The three examples used in the present article (‘Weimar’, 
‘Wien’ and ‘Wallace’) prove that (a) that the existence 
of Values is fundamental for any polity; (b) that 
mechanisms for their Verification/Implementation are 
essential for their effective protection and (c) that, in 
applying those mechanisms, the competent authorities 
must show a high degree of Virtue1 (understood as 
rational resolve). Only in the ‘Wallace’ case Values, 
Verification and Virtue coincided; it took, however, 
1 I thank Professor Weiler for having drawn my attention 
to this particular aspect.
place in a particular political and legal context which is 
far away from the reality of the European Union.
When fundamental values are put at risk, the European 
Union faces similar problems as international 
organizations and federal states. One of them consists 
in the considerable degree of abstraction of the terms 
employed, another in the high threshold for the use 
of implementation mechanisms often coupled with 
their political character. The present study has shown 
that those difficulties are inevitable, given the highly 
exceptional nature of such situations. We have also 
seen that it is possible to fill those abstract terms with 
life; first and foremost by applying the interpretation 
methods provided by the ECJ’s jurisprudence and also 
by using the Venice Commission’s toolbox on the Rule 
of Law.  
Criticism against the European Union’s institutions’ 
practice should take into account the particular 
context they are acting in. The institutions’ practice 
has to be understood in the framework of the specific 
nature of Union law, in particular the subsidiarity and 
proportionality principle. The Austria case has shown 
that it can be paradoxical and counterproductive to 
defend the Rule of Law whilst at the same time violating 
some of its basic principles.
Often commentators do not ask the question which 
everyone who has to take a decision is confronted 
with: what is the risk of creating ‘a false positive’ 
compared to the one of creating  a ‘false negative’ 
(over- or under-enforcement of the rules)? Given the 
high majority thresholds in Article 7 TEU this risk is 
considerable. Therefore it seems comprehensible to 
prefer a dialogue-based approach whenever possible. 
If this method fails, the institutions need the necessary 
resolve in order to act swiftly against threats to or 
violations of the Rule of Law. At the same time, they 
have to respect scrupulously the requirements of the 
Rule of Law themselves.
Let me close with a quote by US-President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. When he opened the first Law Day in 1958 
he said:
“The clearest way to show what the rule of law means to 
us in everyday life is to recall what has happened when 
there is no rule of law.”695
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